A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State? by House, H. Wayne
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 2
3-1-1999
A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful
Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State?
H. Wayne House
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. Pub. L. 203
(2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol13/iss2/2
A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful 
Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State? 
H. Wayne House* 
"[I]n America we don't have Christian law, Jewish law, Moslem law. 
We only have law-law."1 
Nicholas von Hoffman, syndicated columnist 
"The highest glory of the American Revolution was this; it connected 
in one indissoluble bond the principles of civil government with the princi-
ples of Christianity."2 
John Quincy Adams, sixth President of the United States 
* Copyright © 1999 by H. Wayne House, Professor of Law (Trinity Law School) and 
Professor of Theology and Culture (Trinity Graduate School) at Trinity International University. J.D., 
O.W. Coburn School of Law; Th.D., Concordia Seminary, St. Louis; M.Div., Th.M., Western 
Seminary; M.A., Abilene Christian University; B.A., Hardin-Simmons University. I wish to express 
appreciation to Michael J. Holmes, Jon Paine and Robert Semain for their help in collecting materials 
and checking citations. I also would like to thank James Eriksen, Esq. for reading the article and 
offering suggestions. 
I. Nicholas von Hoffman, "We Don't Have Christian Law or Jewish Law; Only Law-Law," 
(column licensed with King Features, source on file with the author). With these words, syndicated 
columnist Nicholas von Hoffman threw down a gauntlet against any who would presume that the 
law might be viewed from another perspective than a neutral framework. This statement was in 
response to rumors that Oral Roberts University allegedly had a policy against admitting non-
Christian students into their law program and proclaiming that they were attempting in their law 
school to teach a Christian perspective on the law. Von Hoffman continues in his article, 
/d. 
No Jews or agnostics need apply. Catholics, also, probably aren't welcome, although the 
news reports don't make that completely clear . You must also submit letters of 
recommendation from your local fundamentalist ayatollah or pastor, such letters to include 
a detailed description of how well you practice your devoirs, how fervent your prayers 
and how orthodox your thought and theology. 
Von Hoffman makes these acerbic comments without knowing, apparently that the law school had 
a policy of admitting Christians of all faiths as well as Jewish students who should apply and qualify 
under standard law school standards. I have personally known graduates from the law school at ORU 
who were Roman Catholics. As well, I have a letter from the admissions office indicating that they 
not only admit Christians of various persuasions but also have students representing Judaism, Islam, 
and Tibetan Buddhism, among others. 
2. JOHN WINGATE THORNTON, THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION XXIX (1860; 
1970), quoted in WILLIAM J. FEDERER, AMERICA'S GOD AND COUNTRY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
QUOTATIONS 18 (1996). 
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An uneasy peace exists between the kingdom of God and the kingdom 
of the world3 in contemporary America. At an earlier time in American 
history it seemed that Christian religious sects had found the promised 
land similar to what the Israelites had done more than three thousand years 
earlier.4 Arriving from European persecution, largely religious 
persecution,5 these Christian immigrants (Puritans and Separatists or 
Pilgrims alike) were to be "a City upon a hill"6 and the new Israel. 7 
The words of John Quincy Adams at the fiftieth anniversary of the 
inauguration of George Washington as the president of the United Sates, 
reflects this type of perspective shared by Americans at the time: 
Fellow-citizens, the ark of your covenant is the Declaration 
of Independence. Your Mount Ebal, is the confederacy of 
separate state sovereignties, and your Mount Gerizim is the 
Constitution of the United States. In that scene of tremendous 
and awful solemnity, narrated in the Holy Scriptures, there is 
not a curse pronounced against the people, upon Mount Ebal, 
not a blessing promised them upon Mount Gerizim, which your 
posterity may not suffer or enjoy, from your and their 
3. The two kingdoms perspective was a key ingredient of the Reformation (cf Martin 
Luther's kingdom of the left, the state, and the kingdom of the right, the church). See in{ra text 
accompanying notes 166-67. 
4. I speak of the Hebrews' Exodus from Egypt, circa 1445 B.C., although many scholars 
place the date at 1290 B.C. or later. 
5. See the discussion in BENJAMIN HART, FAITH AND FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN LIBERTY 67-75 (1988). 
6. The phrase "a City upon a hill" is taken from Matthew 5:14, where Jesus speaks of a 
"city on a hill" and is used by Puritan John Winthrop, the founder and first governor of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony. The fuller statement in his famous work, A Model of Christian Charity, 
penned on June 11, 1630, says, 
For we must Consider that we shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are 
upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken 
and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and 
a by-word through the world. 
ADAM WINTHROP, "A Model of Christian Charity," 2 WINTHROP PAPERS 1623-1630 (1931) at 292-
295, (quoted in FEDERER, supra note 2, at 700). 
See the discussion on John Winthrop by HART, supra note 5, at 83-96. See also the study on the 
contribution of early Puritans to American constitutionalism, John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City 
on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 41-64 
(1990). 
7. The terminology of the Pilgrims often coincided with that found in the Bible. Hart 
remarks 
They were there on a mission-on God's errand into the wilderness. They were the new 
children of Israel, spiritual descendants of Abraham, sent by the winds of Providence into 
a desolate wasteland, just as Moses and the Jews were sent for 40 years into the desert. 
But the faith of Brewster, Carver, Bradford, and their Pilgrim brethren, that indeed their 
ordeal would serve a purpose, was very definitely the source of their power to begin the 
awesome task of building the United States of America - a fact that should cause even 
the atheist to marvel. 
HART supra note 5, at 78-79. 
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adherence to, or departure from, the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence, practically interwoven into the 
Constitution of the United States. Lay up these principles, 
then, in your hearts, and in your souls - bind them for signs 
upon your hands, that they may be frontlets between your eyes 
- teach them to your children, speaking of them when sitting 
in your houses, when walking by the way, when lying down 
and when rising up - write them upon the doorplates of your 
houses, and upon your gates - cling to them as to the issues of 
life - adhere to them as to the cords of your eternal salvation. 
So may your children's children at the next return of this day 
of jubilee, after a full century of experience under your 
national Constitution, celebrate it again in the full enjoyment 
of all the blessings recognized by you in the commemoration of 
this day, and of all the blessings promised to the children of 
Israel upon Mount Gerizim, as the reward of your obedience to 
the law of God. 8 
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Much has happened in approximately three hundred and fifty years. 9 
What was largely a white European and religiously Protestant populace 
has become ethnically and religiously diverse. 10 This state of affairs has 
become obvious only in this century, since a series of decisions were 
issued by the Supreme Court which disestablished the Christian religion 
from places of influence in the public sphere which it had held for more 
than one hundred and fifty years of America's history as a republic. 
Not only does the past serve as an indication of religion's influence on 
America, but the continued embracing of religion by Americans in the 
contemporary Western world is astounding. 11 Moreover, our public life of 
8. "The Jubilee of the Constitution," A discourse delivered at the request of the New York 
Historical Society in the City of New York, on Tuesday, the 30th of April, 1839, being the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Inauguration of George Washington as the President of the United States, on 
Thursday, the 30th of April, 1789; by John Quincy Adams (entered according to the Act of 
Congress, in the year 1839, by Joseph Blunt, for the New York Historical Society, in the District 
Court of the Southern District of New York, at 56). 
9. This dating refers to the founding of Jamestown in 1609. 
10. It is estimated that America has more than 1200 different religious groups. See Note, II. 
The Complex Interaction between Religion and Government, 100 HARV. L.REV. 1612 (1987). The 
state of religious pluralism in America has been described as "[f]ar from being in a position to 
squelch pluralism, religion today is itself a riot of pluralism." Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and 
Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-
Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903, 913 (1993). 
11. Polls reveal that ninety-five percent of Americans believe in God and seventy percent are 
members of a church or synagogue. Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 407 (1996); Maddigan reveals other statistics even more illustrative: 
[T]he controversy surrounding Establishment Clause issues is likely to continue because 
religion plays an increasingly important, though paradoxical role in American public life. 
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what may be called civil religion 12 reveals an amazing pervasiveness of 
religious faith in the public sphere, from common parlance to the chambers 
of the Supreme Court. Religion is in the life of the people in cliches (thank 
God its Friday), holidays (Christmas, Easter, even Halloween [hallowed 
eve]), cities in which they live (St. Paul, Corpus Christi), attendance at 
religious worship13 and reporting of the polls!4 music and art (Christmas 
carols in shopping centers, Amazing Grace a top tune on secular stations, 
and religious art in art galleries, including the National Art Gallery in 
Washington, D.C.), to mention widely known examples. 
The civil religion of America is also obvious in the statements and 
proclamations of its leaders (e.g. presidents and candidates saying God 
bless America at conventions and television addresses, prayer breakfast 
addresses by government leaders); the appearance of "In God We Trust" 
on its coinage; our pledge of allegiance including "one nation under God;" 
observance of "national days of prayer;" the use of the Bible for 
administering oaths to federal and state officials as well as to witnesses in 
court; Thanksgiving as a national holiday; religious statements etched in 
stone on government buildings; recognition of Sunday in the Constitution 
as a day in which bills do not need to be signed; the ways in which prayer 
is offered in the federal and state legislative chambers and in the courts of 
the land; acknowledgment of God in state preambles; and the presence of 
the Decalogue behind the Justices of the Supreme Court. 15 
Considering the pervasiveness of religion, especially the Christian 
religion, on so many facets of the private sector and the governmental 
sector too, one would think that religion and the state were on friendly 
Statistics show that Americans are among the most religious people in the world. More 
than 94% of Americans believe in God or a universal spirit, 71% believe in heaven, and 
53% believe in hell. More than 40% of Americans attend church or synagogue weekly. 
with college graduate more likely to go than high school dropouts. Funhemwre, 78% of 
Americans pray at least once a week and 57% pray at least once a day. In fact, 
Americans repol1edly invoke the deity more frequently than they go to work or have sex. 
See Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause. Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 
CALIF. L. REV. 293, 294-295 ( 1993). 
12. Maddigan speaks favorably of the value of civil religion to law and morals. Maddigan. 
supra note II, at 294-348. Richards, on the other hand. believes civil religion is opposed to the 
constitutional government given by the Framers. See David A. J. Richards, Civil Religion and 
Constitutional Legitimacy, 29 WM. & MARY L.REV. 177 (1987). 
13. See Perry, supra note 11, at 407. 
14. !d. 
15. The existence of the Ten Commandments in the Supreme Cou11 chambers is interesting 
in view of the decision of the Coul1 regarding the posting of these commandments in the public 
school classrooms: "The framers and ratifiers could not conceivably have anticipated that the 
Supreme Coul1, sitting in a courtroom with a painting of Moses and the Ten Commandments, would 
hold it an unconstitutional establishment of religion for a high school to have a copy of the Ten 
Commandments on a wall." ROBERT H. 80RK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 289-90 (1996) (referring to the coul1s ruling in Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). 
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terms, certainly not married but at least dating. Such is very often not the 
case. For example, underlying von Hoffman's sardonic comments at the 
head of the article seems to be the assumption shared by many in the legal 
community that there is a safe zone or no-man's land in the law so that a 
person's own world view or value system is not present when dealing with 
the law. 16 They teach this assumption to the uninitiated in the general 
public with slogans like "wall of separation of church and state,"17 or the 
16. A good example of imposing one's own value system is illustrated in statements I have 
made elsewhere: 
A good example of this is found in Justice Brennan's well known perspective on the 
death penalty and the Eighth Amendment. He considers capital punishment to be in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment against Cruel and Unusual Punishment. This very 
statement portends that he can understand the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. But 
he contends that modem society has raised itself above the eighteenth century's archaic 
morality which advocated the death penalty. This position, however, is wrought with 
inconsistency since the Eighth Amendment is in tandem with the provisions for capital 
crimes. Moreover, the morality of the eighteenth century in this area has not significantly 
fluctuated to the present day. Consistently, the public has favored capital punishment by 
large margins. 
So how does Brennan support this thesis? He substitutes his wisdom for that of the 
Framers who included capital punishment, those Justices who have not sequaciously 
followed him, and the public, he admits, who in general disagree with him. This 
assuredly is problematic for a Justice who has sworn to uphold and defend the 
Constitution and is required to serve under good behavior. 
H. WAYNE HOUSE, Introduction to RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION: Is JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DESTROYING 
THE CONSTITUTION? 5 (H. Wayne House ed., 1987). 
17. Even before Jefferson's phrase "wall of separation between Church and State" written to 
the Danbury Baptists (see Daniel S. Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles": The 
Danbury Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and the "Wall of Separation," 39 J. CHURCH AND STATE 455 
( 1997) for a thorough look at the Danbury letter and Jefferson's views of church and state), appeared 
in Everson (see infra text accompanying notes 286-90, especially comment by Levy note 286), its 
first use in a Supreme Court opinion, to my knowledge, was in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164, where the Court was reviewing the history of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
particularly the First Amendment: 
Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury 
Baptist Association . . . took occasion to say: Believing with you that religion is a matter 
which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his 
faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and 
not opinions, - I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of 
separation between church and State. 
Jefferson's mention of the "whole American people" indicates that his concern was with the federal 
legislature, the only body he viewed as capable constitutionally of reaching into religion. His acts as 
president would belie a ftnn wall when sectarian means achieved secular ends (see ROBERT L. CORD, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 115-116 (1982) or 
when individual states acted in the area of religion (see Dreisbach, supra at 471-481). Some believe 
that Jefferson may have developed his metaphor "wall of separation between church and state" from 
Rhode Island Baptist leader Roger Williams who had earlier said: 
when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of 
the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broken down the wall itself, 
removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that 
therefore if He will eer please to restored His garden and paradise again, it must of 
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dogma that law operates in a religionless vacuum. Such a perspective 
would be shared by few in the first two centuries of the Republic 18 and 
proves not to be the reality, in my view, that one encounters in the 
academy, the courts, or the marketplace today. 19 The purpose of this article 
is to examine the present state of affairs between religion and the state, to 
investigate the historic relationship between church and state, and to 
evaluate the current status of establishment clause jurisprudence in light of 
the present and historic perspectives, and last to offer a modest suggestion 
as to how these questions can be better approached to minimize church 
and state tension in America. 
The organization of the article is found in three parts. Part I presents 
how Christianity is often treated in the legal sphere in society so that 
religious values are pushed from the public sphere to the private realm. 
Part II sets forth evidence that such has not always been the case. In fact, 
Christian perspectives dominated the moral and legal thought of the West 
and heavily influenced the development of law in Western Europe and 
England, as well as the founding and development of American 
government and law. Part III seeks to demonstrate that the failure of the 
Supreme Court to articulate a consistent and historically informed meaning 
of religion has produced contradictory and confusing Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. This section also examines ways in which the Court has 
stipulated and experimented with various legal theories and how legal 
writers have sought to provide guidance to the Court in this area. 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON CHRISTIAN VALUES IN SECULAR 
SOCIETY 
A. The Current State of Law and Religion in American Law 
The attempt of religious citizens, particularly the majority religion, 
Christianity, to make an impact on the political and legal process has fallen 
on hard times in recent years under a theory that the law should reflect no 
religious view since this would violate the Establishment Clause. 20 The 
fact that this might be an expression of the free exercise of religion21 
necessity be walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world. 
(quoted in JOHN EIDSMOE, THE CHRISTIAN LEGAL ADVISOR 143 (1984)). 
To Williams, the purpose of the wall was to protect the church from the government, not vice 
versa. /d. Dreisbach, however, provides evidence for a common source to Jefferson and Williams 
in the Scotsman James Burgh. See Dreisbach, supra at 486-490. 
18. See infra text accompanying note 156. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 178-463. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 253-368. 
21. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise thereof [religion]." U.S. 
CONST. amend I. 
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carries little weight, for in the jurisprudence of the Court, the 
Establishment Clause, which is absolute, always trumps the free exercise 
clause which is more narrow as to conduct, though not belief.Z2 
The desire to have one's deepest convictions have an impact in the 
culture or marketplace of ideas receives a judicial rebuff in a way that 
would have been unheard of in former days for two reasons. First, the 
court has come to believe that religious views, apart from clearly stated 
secular purposes, are violative of the Establishment Clause. 23 Second, the 
arm of the federal government, against which the First Amendment is 
addressed, was once short. The states, before the incorporation doctrine,24 
22. The meaning of "religion" in the Establishment Clause is viewed as absolute by the 
courts, whereas "religion" in free exercise is limited, with the right to believe being absolute but the 
right to practice one's belief being necessarily limited. The Court enunciated this free exercise belief-
action dichotomy in Cantwell, where Justice Roberts explained that 
the amendment raises two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first 
is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject 
to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate 
definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to 
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe 
the protected freedom. 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
23. This perspective gave rise to the famous "secular purpose" doctrine developed in Lemon. 
See infra at text accompanying notes 318-30. Allen affirmed the appeals court of New York (20 
N.Y.2d 109, 117 (1967)) which pennitted distribution of materials to citizens without regards to 
religious affiliation: 
The Court of Appeals said that the law's purpose was to benefit all school children, 
regardless of the type of school they attended, and that only textbooks approved by public 
school authorities could be loaned. It therefore considered "completely neutral with respect 
to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the individual 
student and asking no question about what school he attends." 
Board of Education of Central School District No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 (1968). 
Lemon sought to limit the practice advocated in Allen but found itself enmeshed in its own web 
of entangling itself in religion: 
The Court held that before the state could aid the secular component of sectarian 
education, the state must ensure that public aid would not breach the imaginary wall 
erected between the secular and religious components. In order to satisfy this command, 
the state was required to employ vigilant and comprehensive surveillance to ensure that 
no aid be used for the inculcation of religion. The states had undertaken to do so in this 
case by conditioning aid on the schools' acquiescence to state audit to ensure compliance 
with grant restrictions. The Court concluded, however, that such surveillance necessarily 
entailed excessive government interference in the affairs of religious schools and therefore 
resulted in an unconstitutional entanglement between government and religion. Justice 
Rehnquist subsequently described this situation as the Lemon test's "Catch-22." Aid to 
sectarian schools must be vigorously policed lest it be put to sectarian use and thereby 
violate the effects test. Yet this supervision constitutes an impermissible entanglement. 
That of course leaves only one solution: exclude religious schools from receiving 
government aid altogether. 
Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of' Sectarian Education: Establishment and Free Exercise Clause 
Implications, 2 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REV. 7, 22-23 (1993). 
24. From Everson on the court has recognized the Establishment Clause as incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. The difficulty of this clause being applied 
against the states in view of the state churches that existed at the time of the writing of the 
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had the freedom to establish or disestablish religion,25 at the behest of the 
citizenry, through political debate and were more pluralistic in their 
treatment of other religions within their borders than sometimes assumed. 26 
With incorporation this is no longer the case; and uniformity rather than 
diversity is enforced on all. 27 With the ever enlarging growth of 
government at all levels, the area of the public has increased so that 
religious expression finds fewer and fewer places in which one can express 
her views without inviting a charge of violation of "separation of church 
and state."28 
amendment has been answered by Brennan in Schempp, 
It has been suggested, with some support in history, that [incorporation of the 
establishment clause] is conceptually impossible because the Framers meant the [clause] 
also to foreclose any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state 
churches. [But] the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved more than three 
decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the problem of 
protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly have been any 
concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments. 
Quoted in G. GUNTHER and K. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1466-1467 (13th ed. 1997) 
25. The puzzling silence of the federal constitution makes more sense if seen in this light: 
[O]ne important function of the First Amendment was to restrain the federal government's 
power to interfere with state regulation of religion. The state was the appropriate overseer 
of religion under the federal system, and states were assumed to have been left free to 
establish, disestablish, or partially establish religion as they saw fit. 
ELIZABETH B. CLARK, Church-State Relations in the Constitution-Makin[J Period, in CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICA: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE: THE COLONIAL AND EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD 157 
(John. F. Wilson ed., 1986) (quoted in James J. Knicely, High Wall or Lines of Separation 7 , 6 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 261, 274). 
26. Strict separationist Leonard Levy recognizes the truthfulness of this: 
Clearly the provisions . show that to understand the American meaning of "an 
establishment of religion" one cannot arbitrarily adopt a definition based on European 
experience. In every European precedent of an establishment, the religion established was 
that of a single church. Many different churches, or the religion held in common by all 
of them, i.e., Christianity or Protestantism, were never simultaneously established by any 
European nation. Establishments in America, on the other hand, both in the colonial and 
early state periods, were not limited in nature or in meaning to state support of one 
church. An establishment of religion in America at the time of the framing of the Bill 
of Rights meant government aid ahd sponsorship of religion, principally by impartial tax 
support of the institutions of religion, the churches. 
Not one of the six American states maintaining establishments of religion at the that time 
preferred one church to others in their constitutional law. Even in New England where 
the Congregational church was dominant as a result of numerical superiority, there were 
constitutional and legal guarantees against subordination or preference. Such an 
establishment can hardly be called an exclusive or preferential one, as in the case where 
only one church, as in all European precedents, was the beneficiary. 
LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGEMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 201-202 (1972) 
27. See Stephen B. Presser, Some Realism about Atheism: Responses to the Godless 
Constitution, I TEX. REv. L & PoL 87, 121 (1997) (interacting with the perspectives of Kramnick 
and Moore regarding whether the Framers intended a purely secular Constitution and government). 
28. The term "separation of church and state" is not found in the First Amendment but if 
read literally would more accurately reflect the meaning of the First Amendment, that is. the 
separation of the institution of the church from the institution of the state, not speaking to the matter 
of the religious influences on governmental views and functions, nor to accommodations or benefits 
that the governmental may give to religious citizens and causes which are religious in nature. 
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Whether one believes there to be a necessary nexus between law and 
religion very likely depends on whether one speaks of law and religion in 
the twentieth century or in the earlier periods of our history. As subsequent 
analysis will demonstrate,29 this state of affairs is of recent origin and is 
largely due to the development of a world view which has been adopted by 
the courts different than that shared by lawyers and judges in the Western 
world for the last several hundred years. 30 Until recently, religious 
perspectives, particularly Christianity, informed the law, providing the 
moral basis for the requirements of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, 
that the law requires to have credibility and effectiveness. The reason for 
this is that religion informed of all life. As Professor Steven Smith says, 
Religious premises, assumptions, and values provided the 
general framework within which most Americans thought 
about and discussed important philosophical, moral, and 
political issues. For that reason, Americans of the time could 
not seriously contemplate a thoroughly secular political 
culture from which religious beliefs, motives, purposes, 
rhetoric, and practices would be filtered out.31 
It is not, however, simply the rejection of Christian morality and the 
substitution of another religious persuasion that is at question. Modem law 
disavows adherence to any religious basis to its pronouncements whether 
in the halls of the legislatures or in the court chambers. Under the guise of 
secular versus sacred, modem law is supposedly neutral to religious edicts 
of right and wrong in contrast to the important dependence on religious 
views for most of recorded history. 32 
B. Religion as the Black Sheep of Western Liberty in Modern Law 
1. The marginalization of Christianity, and other religious views, m 
America's public square 
Christianity has come on hard times in America in contrast to its 
pervasive influence on law and culture in the previous two centuries. 
Judge Robert Bark says that there is even a fear among many in the 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 79-270. 
30. See Virginia Armstrong. The Flight From America's Foundations: A Panoramic 
Perspective on American Law, in RESTORING THE CoNSTITUTION 103-134 (H. Wayne House ed., 
1987) 
31. Steven D. Smith, Separation of the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment 
Decision. 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 966 (1989). 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 59-78. 
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general public about the enforcement of Christian morality in the public 
square: 
It thus appears, at least for society as a whole, that the major 
and perhaps only alternative to "intellectual and moral 
relativism and/or nihilism" is religious faith. That conclusion 
will make many Americans nervous or hostile. While most 
people claim to be religious, most are also not comfortable with 
those whose faith is strong enough to affect their public 
behavior. That can be seen in the reaction of many Americans 
to the appearance in the public square of religious 
conservatives. A letter to the editor, for example, proclaims, 
The "ardor" shown by many people of the religious right is 
often intolerance masquerading as principle. In seeking to 
impose its ideas about school prayer, abortion and a host of 
other issues on society at large, the religious right is pursuing 
a program of bigotry and demagoguery that is antithetical to 
the U.S.'s pluralistic heritage. 
The fear of religion in the public arena is all too typical of 
Americans, and particularly the intellectual class, today. 
Religious conservatives cannot "impose" their ideas on society 
except by the usual democratic methods of trying to build 
majorities and passing legislation. In that they are not 
different from any other group of people with ideas of what 
morality requires. All legislation "imposes" a morality of one 
sort or another, and, therefore, on the reasoning offered, all 
law would seem to be antithetical to pluralism. The references 
to "bigotry" and "demagoguery" seem to mean little more than 
that the author would like to impose a very different set of 
values.33 
But if religious meaning is divorced from the public arena, this does 
not mean that the square will be empty. Rather, other ideologies will vie 
for the place of prominence, and often escape notice or scrutiny by the 
courts that often look for "holy books" instead of worldviews in defining 
religion. Judge Bark anticipates this type of take over. 
By removing religion from the public space, we marginalize it; 
we deny its importance to society and relegate it to the private 
sphere. But if men need a transcendence that can be brought 
to bear on public affairs, and if religion is denied that role, 
other forms of transcendence, some of them quite ugly and 
threatening, may move in to occupy the empty space. In part, 
33. BORK, supra note 15, al 277. 
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that has already happened. Many of the causes of the day -
from environmentalism to animal rights - are pressed with an 
enthusiasm, a zealotry, that can only be called religious, and 
sometimes violence has resulted. There is also a splintering of 
morality when religion no longer provides a common set of 
moral assumptions.34 
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In similar tones, Stephen Carter, Yale law professor, believes that the 
importance of religious beliefs are minimized alongside of other societal 
interests: 
In contemporary American culture, the religions are more 
and more treated as just passing beliefs - almost as fads, 
older, stuffier, less liberal versions of so-called New Age -
rather than as the fundaments upon which the devout build 
their lives. (The noes have it!) And if religions are 
fundamental, well, too bad - at least if they're the wrong 
fundaments - if they're inconvenient, give them up! If you 
can't remarry because you have the wrong religious belief, 
well, hey, believe something else! If you can't take your exam 
because of a Holy Day, get a new Holy Day! If the government 
decides to destroy your sacred lands, just make some other 
lands sacred! If you must go to work on your sabbath, it's no 
big deal! It's just a day off1 Pick a different one! If you can't 
have a blood transfusion because you think God forbids it, no 
problem! Get a new God! And through all of this trivializing 
rhetoric runs the subtle but unmistakable message: pray if you 
like, worship if you must, but whatever you do, do not on any 
account take your religion seriously. 35 
34. !d. at 274. 
35. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 14-15 (1993). Carter gives some examples of kinds of activities 
that are considered taboo in modern liberal thought: 
When Hillary Rodham Clinton was seen wearing a cross around her neck at some 
of the public events surrounding her husband's inauguration as President of the United 
States, many observers were aghast, and one television commentator asked whether it was 
appropriate for the First Lady to display so openly a religious symbol. But if the First 
Lady can't do it, then certainly the President can't do it, which would bar from ever 
holding the office an Orthodox Jew under a religious compulsion to wear a yarmulke. 
Back in the mid-1980s, the magazine Sojourners - published by politically liberal 
Christian evangelicals - found itself in the unaccustomed position of defending the 
conservative evangelist Pat Robertson against secular liberals who, a writer in the 
magazine sighed, "see[m] to consider Robertson a dangerous neanderthal because he 
happens to believe that God can heal diseases." The point is that the editors of 
Sojourners. who are no great admirers of Robertson, also believe that God can heal 
diseases. So do tens of millions of Americans. But they are not supposed to say so. 
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2. Religious expression is privatized 
Many are open to religion being generally unencumbered by the 
government but it must stay out of the public arena to escape the control of 
the state. 36 As Bork has stated, "The difficulty is that within the last 
several decades, the Supreme Court, at the urging of organizations such as 
the ACLU, has read the clause as though it commanded the separation of 
religion and society.'m This evolving perspective in the Supreme Court is 
found in Lemon, where it declared "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion 
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions 
of private choice."38 The legal community reflects similar thinking, as 
illustrated by the comment of Lawrence Friedman that "religion is an 
individual choice, a private not a public matter."39 
In the early 1980s, the state of New York adopted legislation that, in effect, requires 
an Orthodox Jewish husband seeking a civil divorce to give his wife a get - a religious 
divorce - without which she cannot remarry under Jewish law. Civil libertarians attacked 
the statute as unconstitutional. Said one critic. the "barriers to remarriage erected by 
religious law . . only exist in the minds of those who believe in the religion." If the 
barriers are religious, it seems, then that are not real barriers. they are "only" in the 
woman's mind - perhaps even a figment of the imagination. 
When the Supreme Court of the United States, ostensibly the final refuge of religious 
freedom, struck down a Connecticut statute requiring employers to make efforts to allow 
their employees to observe the sabbath, one Justice observed that the sabbath should not 
be singled out because all employees would like to have "the right to select the day of 
the week in which to refrain from bbor." Sounds good, except that, as one scholar has 
noted, "It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has 'selected the 
day of the week in which to refrain from labor,' since the Jewish people have been under 
the impression for some 3,000 years that this choice was made by God." lf the sabbath 
is just another day off, then religious choice is essentially arbitrary and unimportant; so 
if one sabbath day is inconvenient, the religiously devout employee can just choose 
another. 
... When President Ronald Reagan told religious broadcasters in 1983 that all the laws 
passed since biblical times "have 'not improved on the Ten Commandments one bit," 
which might once have been considered a pardonable piece of rhetorical license, he was 
excoriated by political pundits, including one who charged angrily that Reagan was giving 
"short shrift to the secular laws and institutions that a president is charged with 
protecting." And as for the millions of Americans who consider the Ten Commandments 
the fundaments on which they build their lives, well, they arc no doubt subversive of 
these same institutions. 
/d. at 4-6. 
36. See R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible, 27 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 147, 166-170 (1993) for an interaction with the preclusion of religious arguments from 
public debate. 
37. BORK, supra note 15, at 289. 
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 625 ( 1971 ). Richard S Myers, The Supreme Court 
and the Privatization of' Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 36 (1991 ), believes that the privatization 
in regards to religious school issues is losing influence on the Court. 
39. LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 165 ( 1990), quoted in Myers, 
supra note 38, at note 14. Observe the comment of the attorney general of New York, who speaking 
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3. Hostility against religious influence in American society 
Professor Kent Greenawalt has described the kind of hostility that 
exists in certain elements of society: "A good many professors and other 
intellectuals display a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that 
amounts to thinly disguised contempt for the belief in any reality beyond 
that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience."40 
Professor Randall Rainey has suggested that such persons may be 
classified as "enlightenment or liberal fundamentalists." He says that he 
uses the term 
as a general term to describe the tenancy of a certain strand of 
liberal thought to oppose the non theocratic presence of religion 
in the political life of the community . . . . [T]he term is 
intended to describe that variant of liberalism that reveals, 
with varying degrees of intensity, an antireligious "stance" or 
"disposition." While this stance may not be cast as a full 
position, it may readily be discerned as an "undercurrent" in 
the treatment of religion in a variety of disciplines, including 
law.41 
When one speaks of legislating moralit/2 or of the impact of a judges' 
religious worldview on her judicial decisions,43 or actions of the 
against the claims of those who advocated their freedom of speech had been violated on the basis 
of content: 
[u]nlike the community purposes for which authority is designated in the statute, religion 
is an "individual experience," that is "inviolately private." Religion "must be a private 
matter for the individual." Religious advocacy, like petitioners' effort to persuade the 
community residents to "instill" "Christian values" in their children "from an early age," 
serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only to those 
who already believe. 
Brief for Respondent Attorney General at 24, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. 
Dist. (quoted in Michael W. McConnell, God is Dead and We Have Killed Him'.· Freedom of 
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 163, 165 (1993)). See Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
40. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1998). 
41. Rainey, supra note 36, at 154 (1993). 
42. See generally NORMAN GEISLER & FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY (1998) (arguing 
that the legislation of morality is inevitable). 
43. See generally Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S. D. Ala. 1987), 
reprinted in AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL: IS SECULAR HUMANISM A RELIGION? (The opinion of 
Judge W Brevard Hand in the Alabama Textbook Case) (Center for Judicial Studies 1987) 
(attempting to overturn the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause interpretation in a district court 
decision) and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that a daily period of silence in public 
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer was violation of the establishment clause); See the 
following essays which demonstrate the degree to which judicial decisions and legislative enactments 
are influenced by religious views of the judges and legislators: Scott C. Idleman, The Role of 
Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993); Stephen L. Carter, The 
Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Religious 
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government that affect religion, the issue is not whether religion and these 
areas mix but to what degree they mix. 
Belief that a secular state must be separated from the sacred,44 - that 
legal perspectives and laws must not be unduly influenced by religious 
ideology - puts people of faith and their perspectives in a second class 
status in American culture. They are at the best tolerated.45 But some 
religious sentiments are not even tolerated. Judge Bork speaks of the 
manner in which the journalistic guild reacted to religious statements made 
by Governor Mario Cuomo: 
Journalist Fred Barnes, for example, reports a dinner with 
then Governor Mario Cuomo and a dozen journalists during 
which Cuomo said he sent his children to Catholic schools 
because "The public schools inculcate a disbelief in God." 
Barnes wrote, "From the reaction of my colleagues, one might 
have thought Cuomo had advocated mandatory snake-
handling as a test of faith for the state's students." They 
peppered the Governor with dozens of hostile questions. There 
is, Barnes says, a "peculiar bias in mainstream American 
journalism against traditional religions . . . . [W]henever 
religion comes in contact with politics or public policy, as it 
increasingly does, the news media reacts in three distinct 
ways, all negative. Reporters treat religion as beneath 
mention, as personally distasteful, or as a clear and present 
threat to the American way of life."46 
Convictions and Law MakinK, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985). 
44. An interesting problem with the terms "secular" and "sacred" is that the Coun desires to 
be secular, a term defined in the dictionary as "irreligion" or non-religious. Yet II advocates that it 
is neutral between religion and irreligion. This seems to be like the fox in the henhouse saying he 
is neutral between whether chickens should be eaten or not. In reality, the Coun C<m never be truly 
or absolute neutral. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case .fin Government Cooperation with 
Faith-Based Social Service Prol'iders, 46 EMORY L.J. I ( 1997). "Indeed, to demand that any theory 
of church/state relations transcend its pedigree or its presuppositions and be substantively neutral is 
to ask the impossible." ld. at 2. 
45. Myers speaks of tolerance as the "sense of grudging concession to a practice of which 
one disapproves." Myers, su1m1 note 38, at n.46. He continues, 
!d. 
It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public 
schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American citizens in an 
atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any son ~ an atmosphere 
in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American groups and 
religions. This is a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and 
patriotic . The Court's enthusiasm for government indoctrination and distrust for 
religious indoctrination IS instructive. It now seems generally recognized that the public 
schools are not religiously neutral. 
46. BORK, supra note 15, at 291 
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Another significant example is the response to the religious remarks of 
Justice Antonio Scalia, which he made in a non-judicial private setting 
about the requirement of Christian sacrifice. Paulsen and Johnson give as 
assessment of these seemingly alarmist responses: 
In our judgment, Scalia's remarks - and especially the 
remarkable reaction they elicited - do indeed have much to 
say about open-mindedness, tolerance, objectivity, and judicial 
ethics. But the lessons they teach are precisely the opposite of 
those urged by Scalia's critics. The reactions to Antonin 
Scalia's prayer breakfast homily reflect a shocking ignorance 
about Christian theology and biblical literature, about the 
First Amendment's protections of freedom of speech and of 
religion, and about the role of religion (and personal 
statements about religion) in a pluralistic public square.47 
Though separatists in the media or the courts are desirous to limit the 
influence of religion in the public square, particularly the public schools, 
they are not as fastidious about other ideologies. McConnell seeks to 
explain the way in which secularists view the religious impulse: 
From a secular point of view, it is difficult to appreciate the 
religious impulse. Faith seems antithetical to reason and 
obedience to higher authority seems submissive and 
antidemocratic. A liberalism based on individualism, 
independence, and rationalism thus has a tendency to see 
traditional religion as authoritarian, irrational, and divisive-
as a potential threat to our democratic institutions rather than 
as one of their sturdiest pillars, as was typically thought at the 
Founding. Today, it is not unusual to find law professors 
writing that religions "undermine rather than mutually 
reinforce habits of mind necessary for democratic decision-
making," or that religion is "fundamentally incompatible with 
[the] intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic state." 
Justice John Paul Stevens has called religions "divisive forces" 
and told us that it is vital to keep these forces out of our public 
schools - even when the religious activity in question is 
voluntary, extracurricular, and student-initiated. This, he 
says, is because the schools are "the symbol of our democracy 
and the most pervasive means of promoting our common 
destiny." Needless to say, modern liberals see no need to keep 
other "divisive forces" out of the schools. Indeed they are the 
first to protest "censorship" when Soul on Ice or books 
47. Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson. Scalia·.,. Sermonette. 72 NoTRE DAME L. 
REV. 863. 866 (1997) 
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containing vulgar and offensive language are removed from 
the curriculum.48 
The hostility has grown to the degree that the free exercise clause has 
been turned on its head, with the concern being "freedom from religion" 
rather than "freedom of religion." McConnell elucidates this theme: 
With such a change in perspective, freedom of religion came to 
be seen as less important than freedom from religion. It is 
revealing that Felix Frankfurter, the prototypical liberal of 
this school, described religious freedom as "freedom from 
conformity to religious dogma," and Justice Harry Blackmun 
describes the Establishment Clause as protecting "secular 
liberty" (not "religious liberty"). This is a far cry from those 
who understood religious freedom as willing obedience to the 
sovereignty of God, and gave it pride of place in our First 
Amendment.49 
A contemporary example of this view of "religious liberty" is found in 
an Oregon case, Meltebeke v. BOL/. 50 The state of Oregon argued that an 
employer who had "witnessed" to an employee at least twice per week for 
a period of a month both on and off the job and to employee's relatives 
and fiance and labeled employee "sinner" because his lifestyle did not 
conform to employer's religious beliefs was in violation of "religious 
harassment."51 Whereas the state regulation52 seemly was written to protect 
an employed person from being harassed by his employer because of the 
employed person's religion, BOLl and the ACLU argued that it was a 
prohibition of a person with religious conviction (here the employer) from 
harassing another (with no stated religious conviction) because of the 
employer's religious views. The dissent in the case creates a new right, 
"freedom from religion": 
Freedom from religious harassment exists for atheists, 
agnostics and the nonobservant, as well as for the 
demonstrably religious. For many, freedom from religion is as 
important as freedom to practice religion. I believe freedom 
from religion is entitled to the same level of constitutional, 
statutory and administrative protection in the workplace. I 
48. McConnell, supra note 39, at 173-174. 
49. !d. at 174. 
50. Meltebeke v. BOLl, 120 Or. App 273 (1993), ufj'd, 322 Or. 132 (Or Sup. Ct) (1995) 
51. !d. at 273. 
52. The statute reads: "ORS 659.030(l)(b): (l) .[l]t is an unlawful employment 
practice: .(b) For an employer, because of an individual's . . religion, . . to discrimmate 
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." 
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also do not agree with the lead opinion that an intent element 
is essential in order to uphold BOLl's rule from a facial or an 
as-applied attack. I am not sure how intent could ever be 
shown in this context. 
While it is true that Oregon's guarantees of religious 
freedom are intended to permit minorities to engage in 
religious practices that the majority might find objectionable, 
what occurred here went far beyond the mere providing of 
religious information. I would therefore hold that the intensity 
of uninvited religious proselytizing by the employer in this 
case constituted common harassment and religious 
discrimination within the meaning of the rule and the statute, 
and that such conduct is not constitutionally protected.53 
219 
Though the Court has traditionally recognized the importance of not 
taking sides in regards to religion or irreligion in Establishment Clause 
cases where governmental action is in view, the new "freedom from 
religion" carries such a view into the private sphere. One could ask 
whether "freedom from speech" would establish no speech zones, so that if 
one walks into a discussion that one does not like the discussion must stop 
since the offended party's freedom from speech must be honored. Or 
perhaps, if one joins a group in which the new person entering the group 
does not like one of the parties, the unliked person must leave to fulfill the 
new person's "freedom from association." Though the Jaw recognizes that 
all freedoms have limitations, it does not usually acknowledge that the 
rights of the Bill of Rights are negatives rather than positives. 
4. Denial of America's Christian heritage 
One might ask why Christian values should have any more moral 
authority than any other competing system? The obvious response is that 
this is primarily the underlying substructure of American law, society, and 
culture that has served the country well. In addition, to change the moral 
foundation of the nation may undermine the liberty that such a foundation 
has provided. To counter such a claim, some have argued that the intention 
of the Framers was to create a "godless constitution" to minimize the 
influence of Christianity in the formation of the new govemment.54 This 
perspective is countered by a large amount of evidence to the contrary, as 
Presser explains, 
53. /d. at 293 (Riggs. J. dissenting). 
54. See generally ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE 
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996). 
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Indeed, the commonplace view until very recently that the 
United States was a "Christian Nation" was repeatedly 
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court and on 
countless public occasions by spokesmen for a myriad of 
political views. For most of our history, then, most of our 
leaders appeared not to have believed in a Godless constitution 
at all. 55 
Though certainly I would support a broad understanding of religious 
freedom in our pluralistic society today, it is flawed thinking that the 
Constitution does not have a particular religious worldview standing 
behind it. The Framer's had inherited perspectives from both the 
conservative enlightenment, especially in the thinking of John Locke, 56 and 
heavy reliance on the Bible and western Christianity. The Declaration of 
Independence and the permeation of broad (non-sectarian) views of the 
nature of God and reality both underlie the document that sets order to the 
state that formed in 1776.57 
II. ONCE UPON A TIME: THE CHRISTIAN PAST IN THE WEST AND THE PRE-
EVERSON AMERICA 
Though there are some who would deny the reliance of American law 
and government on its Christian roots, this position is hard to sustain. It is 
not within the intent of this article to give a comprehensive presentation of 
data regarding the Christian influences on Western law but I will provide a 
few examples of how this influence played out in the Europe, England, 
and America. 58 
55. See Presser, supra note 27, at 91 (interacting with the perspectives of Kramnick and 
Moore). Also see the interaction between Kramnick and Moore and Dreisbach. See Isaac Kramnick 
and R. Laurence Moore, Our Godless Constitution, LIBERTY 12 (May/June 1996); Daniel L. 
Dreisbach, A Godless Constitution, LIBERTY II (Nov/Dec 1996); Dreisbach, LIBERTY 2 (March/April 
1996). See al.w DanielL. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of 
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the 
United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927 (1996). 
56. See infra text accompanying footnotes 82-102. 
57. It is a mistake to believe that the Constitution is the beginning of the American 
government. In reality, the wording of the Declaration itself reveals that the Framers of that 
document viewed themselves as beginning a new government, and the Constitution itself assumes 
the Declaration as the beginning of the government. See infra text accompanying notes 144-55. 
58. An interesting tidbit of how reference to Christian ideals impacted decisions in law is 
found in an interaction between some bishops and monks in the middle ages: 
[A] key question arose in the manuscripters: Which form of legal record is the more 
reliable, oral or written? A historical anecdote involving the investitute controversy 
between the Archbishop of Canterbury's monks and the bishops of King Henry I depicts 
the struggle between orality and literacy that characterized the law at the midpoint of the 
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A. Religious Foundations of Law and Government in Western Europe 
One would search long and hard for a society in the ancient 
Mesopotamian or Mediterranean world in which religion and the religious 
cultus were not inextricably connected to the functions of the state. 59 In the 
words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "[N]o state was ever founded without 
having religion as its basis."6° For example, Greek religion was connected 
to the religious preferences of the city-state as Socrates discovered. 61 In 
Rome, religion was identified with the state, especially the state cult, so 
that the state religion, with occasional tributes to the gods of Greece and 
Rome, was primarily dedicated to the genus of the emperor who embodied 
the divine Rome. 62 Linder comments on the Roman civil religion: 
The Roman Empire provides an even clearer example of the 
concept of civil religion in ancient times. The Roman state cult 
under the emperors served as the civil religion of the realm. 
Various particular religions existed alongside it, and their 
adherents could practice as enthusiastically as they pleased as 
long as they gave nominal acceptance to the state cult. But 
this nominal acceptance was obligatory. Further, the position 
of the emperor made the state cult something of a peculiarity. 
He was both pontifex maximus (chief priest) of the state cult 
scribal period: 
Anselm's monks: "But what about the evidence of the letters?" 
Henry's bishops: "As we don't accept evidence of monks against bishops, why 
should we accept that of a sheepskin?" 
Anselm's monks: "Shame on you' Are not the Gospels written down on sheepskins?" 
M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND I 066-1307 209 ( 1979) (quoted in 
Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover. Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 528 (1992)) 
59. See Kirk for his discussion of the glory and ruin of the Greek world, particularly its 
religious views that could not serve as the basis of lasting liberty and equality. RuSSELL KIRK, THE 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 51-96 (1991). 
60. Quoted in Linder, Civil Religion in Historical Perspective: The Reality that Underlies the 
Concept, 17 J. CHURCH AND STATE 399, 403 (1975). 
61 Socrates was condemned by an Athenian jury in 399 B.C. on a charge of "introducing 
strange gods and corrupting the youth of the city-state. Whether or not these were trumped up 
charges against a man who had professed reverence for the laws of Athens, there is no doubt that 
he had attacked the religio-political order of the day." /d. at 405-06. 
62. See EVERETT FERGUSON, BACKGROUNDS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 153-165 (1987) for a 
look at the "ruler cult" in the Hellenistic world, culminating in the Roman emperor cult. H. Brown 
elucidates this perspective: 
The Roman republic began as a city-state with authority residing in an assembly and with 
the people, symbolically expressed by the political tetragrammaton SPQR. Senatus 
Populusque Romanorum, "the Senate and the People of the Romans", but as its reach 
(das Reich) spread across the Mediterranean world, it was symbolized as the dominium 
(lordship) of a single man, the emperor. 
H. Brown, Civil Authority and the Bible, in THE CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW 112 (H. Wayne 
House ed., 1998). 
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and, after the first century A.D., increasingly an object of 
adoration and worship himself.63 
The connection of religion with the state is also true with the Roman 
world of the fourth century on. With the triumph of Christianity in the 
Roman Empire the tie of this new faith to Roman law seemed a natural 
pair. Christianity already had a natural affinity to law in view of the Old 
Testament so that, as Ullmann has said regarding Roman law, "the law, 
could, as indeed it did, effortless penetrate into the very matrix of the 
rapidly growing Christian doctrinal body."64 One early Christian apologist 
especially helped the church take Roman law under its wings, namely 
Tertullian. He was a Roman jurist and shaped religious ideas into legal 
forms in his writings. He believed that the relationship between God and 
man was a legal relation cast in terms of rights and duties and he often 
used contemporary Roman legal terms to explain Christian theology. 65 
Several ideas in Roman law were consistent with Christian theology. 
One especially important was the monotheistic nature of Christianity. The 
monarchic idea was important to the later Roman emperors but became 
pivotal to Constantine. Ullmann observes, 
By himself striking up monotheistic chords, Constantine 
anticipated the response of the Christians who since the end of 
the first century had held that a clear distinction must be 
drawn between the person of the emperor and his 
governmental power. This view was a concrete application of 
the Pauline thesis as enunciated in the letter to the 
Romans . . . . Their stern and uncompromising attitude 
towards the "divinity" of the emperor's person sharply 
contrasted with their equally uncompromising affirmation of 
the divine origin of the emperor's governmental power.66 
By the time that Theodosius I decreed that the Christian religion was 
the only recognized religion throughout the empire, the union of the 
church and state had become a reality. Ecclesiastical officers were 
appointed public officials; church councils were called by the emperor. 
The way in which the church so readily identified with the governmental 
structure became a new theology: 
63. Linder, supra note 60, at 406. See ~:enerally MICHAEL AUCKLAND SMITH. FROM CHRIST 
TO CONSTANTINE 74-91 (1971); ETHELBERT STAUFFER, CHRIST AND THE CAESARS (trans K. and R. 
Smith, 1955); and AN. SHERWIN-WHITE, ROMAN SOCIETY AND ROMAN LAw IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 
(1963). 
64. WALTER ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 32 (1975) 
65. !d. at 32-33. 
66. !d. at 35. 
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[T]he Church universal was a new society altogether, 
composed as it was of beings who through baptism had shed 
their "naturalness" and had become "new creatures", "new 
men" altogether. By losing their naturalness, they had entered 
a divinely created society - the Church - which followed its 
own principles, its own norms; in short, to the "new creature" 
corresponded a new society and new way of life, the novitas 
vitae. Its basis was the Bible. Its members were subjected to 
the laws as given by divinity and made known through the 
qualified officers. And one of the conclusions that was drawn, 
concerned the very question of government. Here it was above 
all the papacy which was able to call upon a respectable body 
of scholarly opinion . . . supported as it was by its own 
governmental manifestations in the shape of decretals which 
authoritatively claimed that this new society must be governed 
in accord with biblical precept.67 
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Possibly as important as the Christian doctrine which found its way 
easily in the Roman law was the vehicle for that transmission, the Vulgate. 
By the tum of the fourth and fifth centuries Jerome's Latin translation 
became the source of governmental thoughts in the Middle Ages. Latin 
was the language of the cultured and educated classes of the late fourth 
century. Jerome's translation of the Hebrew and Greek Testaments was 
filled with Roman terminology - made easier by the legal terminology of 
the Old Testament but also found in Paul's terminology in the New. The 
Latin Bible and the belief in the totality of the Christian life, even into the 
body politic created a virtual monopoly for church men. 68 
This reliance on the Vulgate had impact for centuries, affecting even 
the development of Anglo-Saxon law in the seventh and eighth centuries. 
The Bible became the one common bond between the various nations, 
provinces, and regions of Western Europe. The God of the Bible became 
the great lawgiver to the different societies. 
For it was axiomatic within the monotheistic framework 
that God was the governing organ of the cosmos. But this 
organ was not accessible to any subjective-human evaluations 
of a moral order or on a moral plane. What divinity had laid 
down, enacted, in short created, was unchangeable. There was 
a singularly unanimous agreement that the cosmos was based 
on an immutable, objective order, precisely because it 
emanated from absolute divinity. Consequently, the law that 
67. !d. at 39. 
68. /d. at 42-43. 
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manipulated the cosmos partook of the objective features of 
the cosmos. On this basis human law could not contradict 
divine law as demonstrated in the Bible, and in some respects 
became, when once issued, part of the world order itself. In the 
last resort this is the explanation of why law in the Middle 
Ages assumed so crucial and overriding a role and was viewed 
with a respect which it has never since enjoyed. 69 
Though this union of Roman law began after the time of Constantine, 
it reached fulfillment in the reign of the emperor Justinian, who in 
approximately A.D. 534 had a massive collection of legal materials 
compiled which wedded Christianity with Roman law. Though often 
known as the Justinian Code,70 it included more than the laws of Justinian. 
After the fall of the west to barbarian hordes,71 Roman law and Christian 
theology was still joined and was adopted by the largely Christian 
barbarians but it was not systematized. 72 This systematization began 
around the year A.D. 1100 due to the beginning of the first modem law 
school in the town of Bologna in Northern Italy. Thousands of students 
each year from all over Europe came to this school to study law as a 
"distinct and coherent body of knowledge."73 But what law was studied? It 
was the works of Justinian and thus the Christianized Roman law served as 
the foundation for the civil law of Western Europe. 74 
There were a few other influences on the development of the law in 
Europe, England and America that should not go unmentioned before we 
must proceed to the major influence on American law, the common law of 
England. Important rulers such as Charlemagne75 and Alfred the Greif 
69. /d. at 46. 
70. Berman provides a breakdown of the Justinian material: 
The manuscript consisted of four parts: (I) the Code (Codex). comprising twelve books 
of ordinances and decisions of the Roman Emperors before Justinian; (2J the Novels 
(Novellae). containing the laws promulgated by Emperor Justinian himself; (3) the 
Institutes (lnstitutiones), a short textbook designed as an introduction for beginning law 
students; and (4) the Digest (Digestum), whose 50 books contain a multitude of extracts 
from the opinions of Roman jurists on a wide variety of legal questions. In a modern 
English translation, the Code takes up I ,034 pages, the Novels 562 pages, the Institutes 
173 pages, and the Digest 2,734 pages. 
HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 37. n.2 ( 1993) 
(citing THE CIVIL LAW (Samuel P. Scotted., 1932)). 
71. See generally RICHARD FLETCHER, THE BARBARIAN CONVERSION: FROM PAGANISM TO 
CHRISTIANITY (1997). 
rule: 
72. BERMAN, supra note 70, at 36. 
73. !d. at 37. 
74. For more discussion on this point see id. at 35-53. 
75. G. de Suvigny explains how Charlemagne understood biblical law and applied it to his 
Charles saw the state as more than the king's private property. He was strongly 
influenced by the ideas of St. Augustine and the Old Testament, and felt a responsibility 
to create an ordered, harmonious society in which all men could work together toward 
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sought to codify biblical law into the secular laws in their realms, and the 
Magna Carta,77 called the "fountainhead of Anglo-American liberty"78 also 
placed a big part of the evolution of Western law. 
B. Major Influences on American Law 
Christianity had various influences on the development of Western 
law. It was embedded in the common law,79 provided the basis to 
eternal salvation. To achieve Christian concord, he labored to discover the causes of 
disorder and injustice. He issued a flood of laws, call capitularies, to correct abuses and 
prevent their reoccun·ence. He imposed on his local agents, the courts, the responsibility 
to enact these Jaws and do justice to all who had complaints .... This activity did much 
to bring order and justice out of the political chaos that had plagued the Frankish state 
at an earlier age. 
EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 26 (quoting G. DE BERRIER DE SAUVIGNY, 3 NEW CATHOLIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 498 (1967)). 
76. Berman speaks of Alfred's codification of biblical law: 
The Laws of Alfred (about A.D. 890) start with a recitation of the Ten Commandments 
and excerpts from the Mosaic Law; and in restating and revising the native Anglo-Saxon 
Jaws. Alfred includes such great principles as: "doom (i.e. judge) very evenly; doom not 
on doom to the rich, another to the poor; nor doom one to your friend, another to your 
foe" (cf Exodus 23:1-3; Deut. 1·16-18). 
HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 55 (1974). 
77. Originally spelled Charta. 
78. EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 27. Eidsmoe, quoting T. Dufwa, says, 
Among the parallels Silving notes between the Bible and the Magna Carta are the "self-
curse" found in both documents, the fear of monarchy and requirement that the king 
adhere to the law found in the Magna Carta and in Deuteronomy 17, the power of 
excommunication or being "cut off from the people," the land as a sanctioning agent 
under an oath, the requirement that law be clearly written (Deut. 27:8) and clearly 
explained (Deut. 1:5), limitations upon punishment (Deut. 25:1-3), like punishment for 
perjury in criminal cases (Deut 13: 15; 19: 17-21 ); (Magna Carta Leonesa, articles 12-13), 
and the covenant as the ultimate source of authority. 
/d. at 28, citing HELEN SILV!NG, SOURCES OF LAW 243-248 (1968). 
Eidsmoe draws one other interesting observation about influence on the Magna Carta, and 
consequently on English common Jaw, that of the Vikings: 
In the ninth century the Danes and Norwegians held considerable portions of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland. There was a boundary in England, the north of which was called 
the "Danelaw" where viking law held sway. Thamar E. Dufwa has traced the effect of 
viking law upon the Magna Carta, comparing the wording of portions of the viking law 
to portions of the Magna Carta and demonstrating that the noblemen who forced King 
John to sign the Magna Carta in 1215 A.D. came mostly from the area north of the 
Danelaw where the vikings had ruled several centuries earlier. The highly individualistic 
character of viking law is reflected in the Magna Carta and in English and American 
institutions today. 
EIDSMOE, at 27 (citing THAMAR E. DUFWA, THE VIKING LAWS AND THE MAGNA CARTA: A STUDY 
OF THE NORTHMEN'S CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON ENGLAND AND FRANCE 39-92 (1963)). 
79. CHING-HSIUNG Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 64 (1955), quoted in Virginia C. Armstrong, 
Law, Politics & the Social Sciences~A Troubled Trinity, 4 SIMON GREENLEAF L. REV. 131 (1984-
l985)("the common law has one advantage over the legal system of any country: it was Christian 
from the very beginning of its history"); see generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity was Part 
of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST. REV 27 (1998) (arguing that the relation of common law to 
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understand the relationship of criminal law and punishment,80 and has 
even been recognized by the American Bar Association as having been the 
root of tort law. 81 
1. The influence of John Locke 
At least five major direct influences fell upon the development of 
American law, with the legal history found in the above discussion serving 
as a shadow upon the picture of American law and liberty. These five are 
the conservative enlightenment as manifested in John Locke, the common 
law of England, the influence of Sir William Blackstone, the influence of 
the Bible itself, and the impact of the Protestant Reformation. 82 
John Locke is generally considered by American historians and legal 
scholars alike as a major influence on the leaders of the American 
Revolution. Carl Becker presents this view of Locke: 
So far as the "Fathers" were, before 1776, directly influenced 
by particular writers, the writers were English, and notably 
Locke. Most Americans had absorbed Locke's works as a kind 
of political gospel; and the Declaration, in its form, in its 
phraseology, follows closely certain sentences in Locke's second 
treatise on government. 83 
Though Locke certainly had importance in the formulation of ideas in the 
Framers of the Declaration of Independence, his ideas of social contract 
had been practiced in the American colonists at least half a century before 
he published his work. 84 Moreover, though Locke discusses rights in his 
work, his Second Treatise on Government contains none of the things 
Christianity, though true, was not controlling in the development of the law). 
80. John E. Witte & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses ol the Law: A Protesta!l/ Source 
of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment'· I 0 J .L. & RELIGION 433 (arguing that the third use of the 
law in Refmmation theology, the moral law. provided a basis for the use of punishment in cmmnal 
law). 
81 Special Committee on the Tm1 Liability System, Towards a Jurisprude11ce of Injun· The 
Conrinuing Creation o{a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law, Committee's Preface 
( 1984), quoted in Douglas H. Cook, Negligence or Strict Liability' A Study in Biblical Tort L,m, 
13 WHITTIER L. REV. l (I '!92): 
!d. 
So far as we know. there is no word in the Bible for "torts." Yet the "norms" which the 
Creator told Moses to set before the Israelites, in the chapter of Exodus following the Ten 
Commandments, arc filled with what we think of as "tort" rules We have indicated 
the depth of the roots of tort law in the Judea-Christian tradition. 
82. This is not to deny that there other influences on various Framers of the government hut 
that these were the major sources of influence on the matter of law and religion. 
83. CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 27 ( 1922, 1942). 
84. The concepts of compact or covenant were well known by the people who came to the 
shores of America. See generally, Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of 
American Constitutionalism. 39 EMORY U. 21 (I '!90). 
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found in the Bill of Rights. American colonists had developed their sense 
of rights, not from Locke, but from the Bible.85 
John Locke was not a radical reformer. He grew up in a Puritan home 
and held strong views on man, sin, and God from that context. His first 
volume on civil government, upon which the second builds, uses Scripture 
as a basis of argument. 86 Some of Locke's views did not mesh with the 
Puritan theology of his upbringing, such as his perspectives on the "state 
of nature" (some problems here with the biblical creation account) and the 
acceptance of the tabula rasa, "blank slate" (in contrast to the Calvinist, 
thus Puritan, doctrine of original sin). 87 Nonetheless, he did accept special 
creation and even wrote an important work on the "reasonableness of 
Christianity",88 including the authority of the Bible: "The Bible is one of 
the greatest blessings bestowed by God on the children of men. - It has 
God for its author; salvation for its end, and truth without any mixture for 
its matter. - It is all pure, all sincere; nothing too much; nothing 
wanting. "89 
In reference to the matter of law and government, Locke believed that 
the "law of nature" had its source and authority in the Creator: 
Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all 
Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make 
for other Men's Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, 
i.e., to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the 
fundamental Law of Nature being preservation of Mankind, no 
Human Sanction can be good, or valid against it.90 
Locke, accordingly, as Blackstone at a later time, 91 did not see the law 
of nature as incompatible with the Bible (the law of God): 
Human Laws are measures in respect of Men whose 
Actions they must direct, albeit such measures they are as 
have also their higher Rules to be measured by, which Rules 
are two, the Law of God, and the Law of Nature; so that Laws 
Human must be made according to the general Laws of 
85. ld. at 39-40 (1990) (arguing that as a covenantal people religion is an important 
background to politics but should not be involved with the Constitution proper). 
86. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 7-118 (ed. Thomas I. Cook. 1947). 
87. EIDSMOE, supra note 17. at 38. 
88. See comments of Hall and references. VERNA M. HALL, THE CHRISTIAN HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 56 ( 1966). 
89. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS- A CYCLOPEDIA OF QUOTATIONS 46 (C.H. Catrevas 
et aL eds .• 1891). quoted in FEDERER, supra note 2, at 399. 
90. JOHN LOCKE, OF CiVIL GOVERNMENT 94, quoted in EIDSMOE, supra note 17. at 39. 
91. See infra text accompanying note 125. 
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Nature, and without contradiction to any positive Law of 
Scripture, otherwise they are ill made. 92 
It is interesting to compare Locke's terms "law of God" and "law of 
nature". This is very close to the statements of the declaration of "the laws 
of nature and [the laws] of nature's God."93 This would seem to be an 
affirmation of what was true in both Locke and Blackstone, that nature and 
the Bible serve as the basis of the liberty to which God calls his creatures 
based on their creation with certain inalienable rights. 94 At another 
instance Locke identified the "law of nature" with Scripture: "And upon 
this is grounded the great Law of Nature, whoso sheddeth Man's Blood by 
Man shall his Blood be shed,"95 quoting Genesis 9:6. 
John Locke is well known for his views on social contract. J. 
Budziszewski gives a helpful breakdown of the logic developing Locke's 
perspective: 
To have a government is to have known, authorized, 
impartial judges over all, whose judgments can be "executed" 
or enforced. 
In the beginning, however, there is no government. This is 
not just our original condition but our natural condition - our 
state of nature. 
Having no government does not mean moral chaos because 
the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it. 
But the fact that people recognize the law of nature does 
not mean that they always obey it, so it must be enforced. 
Enforcement of the natural law means especially 
enforcement of natural rights, probably because individuals 
are responsible only to God in points of natural law that do not 
affect others. 
Enforcement also entails imposing punishments, provided 
they do not exceed the natural-law limits of reparation and 
restraint- that is, provided that they do not go beyond what is 
necessary for compensation of damages and prevention of 
further wrongdoing. 
But because there is no government, each person is 
himself an "executioner" or enforcer of the law of nature. 
Now, even when a person knows the principles that ought 
to be enforced, he finds it difficult to apply them with coolness 
and impartiality when his own interests are concerned. 
92. Quoted in EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 40. 
93. The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776). 
94. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
95. See LocKE, supra note 90, at 60 (quoted in EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 40) 
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For this reason, self-enforcement does not work very well; 
natural rights are persistently violated, and in punishment the 
limits of reparation and restraint are persistently 
transgressed. 
The remedy for this inconvenience is for all the people in a 
particular area to appoint certain persons to serve as impartial 
judges - to be a government. 
But this does not work unless the judges can enforce their 
judgments, and they cannot enforce their judgements unless 
people first agree to transfer their "executive," or enforcement, 
power to the community as a whole. 
The mutual promise or agreement that transfers the 
enforcement power to the community as a whole is called the 
social covenant, or social contract. Once this agreement is 
made, people are said to have left the state of nature and 
entered the state of civil society. 
Entering civil society is not the same thing as setting up a 
government. There is no going back on the agreement to enter 
civil society; however, the people can change their minds about 
the proper form of government.96 
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Not only in his view of the law of nature, but also in social contract, 
Locke recognized its divine origin and authority. To support his view, he 
cited a speech made by King James I in 1609 to Parliament, in which the 
King recognized the source of the contract in the covenant between God 
and Noah: 
And again, in his speech to the parliament 1609, he hath these 
Words, The King bind himself by a double Oath, to the 
Observation of the fundamental Laws of his Kingdom. Tacitly, 
as by being a King, and so bound to protect as well the People, 
as the Laws of the Kingdom, and expressly by his Oath at his 
Coronation; so as every just King, in a settled Kingdom, is 
bound to observe the Paction made to his People, by his Laws 
in framing his Government agreeable Thereunto, according to 
that Paction which God made with Noah after the Deluge. 
Hereafter, seed Time and Harvest, and Cold and Heat, and 
Summer and Winter, and Day and Night, shall not cease 
which the Earth remaineth. And therefore a King governing in 
a settled Kingdom, leaves to be a King, and degenerates into a 
Tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his Laws.97 
96. J. BUDZISZEWSKI. WRJTIEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR NATURAL LAW 98-99 (1997). 
97. "'King James I Speaks to Parliament 1609," in HALL. supra note 88, at 112 (as quoted 
by Locke) 
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2. The common law tradition and Christianity 
A second significant influence on the American Jaw of the eighteenth 
century, even until today, is the common Jaw. When William of Normandy 
conquered England in 1066 he found a nation already rich in culture, 
including a well developed law, unlike what was true of Normandy. He 
pledged to these Englishmen that they could keep their Jaw. Certainly there 
were elements from the more warlike Normans that came into England, 
such as trial by battle, and the ecclesiastical courts were separated from the 
shires and hundreds,98 as well as an oppressive 'forest Jaw' protecting the 
royal hunt,99 causing many of us to recall the legendary Robin Hood and 
his merry men in Sherwood forest. The common Jaw emerged in the 
twelfth century from institutions that had been in elementary form prior to 
1066. The Jaws of the English combined with the strong suit of Normans 
for administration 100 eventually developed into the court systems that 
dispensed judge-made Jaw, called common law. 
"[W]hile the Roman law was a deathbed convert to Christianity, the 
common law was a cradle Christian" 101 wrote John C.H. Wu. Wu, an 
international statesman, jurist and law professor, demonstrated the 
accuracy of his claim by tracing the history of the English common law 
from Bracton to Blackstone. 102 As important to the common law as men 
98. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY ]] (1979). Eidsmoe says 
regarding the law of the Anglo-Saxons prior to the Norman conquest: 
These early Anglo-Saxons maintained a legal and political system very much similar 
to that of Old Testament Israel. They had a system of decentralized government in which 
the head of ten families was called a tithing man, the head of fifty families was called 
a vii-man, the head of a hundred families was called a hundred-man. and the head of a 
thousand families was called an eolderman, later shortened to earl The earl 
governed a territory called a shire, and his assistant was called a "shire reef," later 
shortened to sheriff. 
EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 26 (citing W. CLEON SKOUSEN, MIRACLE Or AMERICA STUDY GUIIll· 20 
(1981)). See also BAKER, supra at 12 on these structures in Anglo-Saxon society. 
99. !d. at II. 
100. !d. at 11-33. 
101. Herbert W. Titus, God's Revelation: Foundation for the Common Law, 4 REGENT U. L. 
REV. ] (1994) (quoting CHING-HSUING Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE: A STUDY IN THE NATURAL LAW 
65 (1955)). See Banner, supra note 79, at 27 ( 1998) (arguing that the relation of common Jaw to 
Chnstianity was not controlling in the development of case law). There was no uniform opinion at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century as to whether the common law embodied Christiamty. 
Jefferson resisted such ideas but a cadre of legal scholars contradicted Jefferson's opinions on this. 
See the discussion on this controversy in Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 988-992. 
102. Titus, supra note I 0 I, at I. See Titus' article for a look at the religious foundations of 
the common law and how the Bible played a definitive part in the development and practice of the 
common law. 
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like Bracton and Coke were, probably no person had as much influence on 
the Framers of our Declaration and Constitution than did Sir William 
Blackstone. 
3. The influence of Sir William Blackstone, professor of common law 
and a Christian 
In the early 1980s three evangelical Christian historians wrote a book 
in which they attempted to demonstrate that Christian thought had minor 
importance to the founding of America. 103 Yet within their book they failed 
even to mention Sir William Blackstone. Often those individuals most 
commonly thought to have influenced the Founding Fathers of our nation 
were of the radical enlightenment, such as Voltaire, Diderot, and 
Helvetius, 104 but actually the conservative revolution of the Founders relied 
much more on Locke for the formation of the new government and men 
like Montesquieu and Blackstone for the structure of the new government. 
Why was not Blackstone reviewed by the above writers as an 
influence on the national legal system? He would seem to be a prime 
candidate according to Lutz: 
The prominence of Blackstone would come as a surprise to 
many, and he is the prime candidate for the writer most likely 
to be left out in any list of influential European thinkers. His 
work is not readily available in inexpensive form, but like 
Montesquieu he was cited frequently by all sides. A trenchant 
reference to Blackstone could quickly end an argument. Such a 
respected writer deserves a much closer look by those studying 
American political thought. 105 
Blackstone wrote his famous Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
to a mixed audience. He offered lectures to those contemplating law as a 
career. They were encouraged to attend his lectures to obtain a general 
knowledge of common law before taking on the rigorous study in the Inns 
of Court. 106 His lectures, then, were to explain broad principles for his 
"young and largely ignorant audience." 107 D.A. Nolan argues that legal 
103. MARK A. NOLL ET AL., The SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA (1983). 
I 04. The Enlightenment may be divided into at least three periods: the first represented by men 
like Montesquieu, Locke, and Pufendorf; the second by Voltaire, Diderot, and Helvetius; and the 
third by Beccaria, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of 
European Writers on Late EiKhteenth-Century American Political ThouKht, 78 THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 189, 190 (1984). 
105. !d. at 195-196. 
106. !.G. Doolittle, Sir William Blackstone and His Commentaries on the Laws of' England 
(1765-9): A Biographical Approach, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 99 (1983). 
107. /d. at 99. 
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education was the true significance of Blackstone rather than Blackstone 
having influence on the founding of America or the political structures 
afterward. 108 But how to separate Blackstone, the writer of the 
Commentaries, from Blackstone, the teacher is difficult to imagine. As 
Lord Coleridge once said, "One speaks and thinks of Blackstone as a 
writer, not as a man." 109 
Many American students returning from the Inns of Court in England 
brought Blackstone back home with them. So popular did he become that 
one thousand copies of his Commentaries were sold at ten pounds per set 
before the first American edition was printed. Prepublication sales for the 
first American edition were I 500. 110 Blackstone's Commentaries became 
the chief, if not the only law book, in every lawyer's office in New 
England. Daniel Webster read Blackstone before beginning the study of 
law in 1804. James Kent, the famous American commentator and 
professor of law, wrote that reading Blackstone at sixteen caused him to 
want to become a lawyer. Abraham Lincoln, in 1835, came into possession 
of the Commentaries and read them intensely.'" Blackstone's influence is 
not only stamped on the dissemination of the common law to a broader 
public, he is also important on the writing of the Declaration of 
Independence. 
4. The influence of Christianity on the Declaration and Constitution 
Scholars have long recognized the influence of the Bible112 and the 
Christian religion on the development of Western law, but many have 
rejected the influence on the organic documents of our government, 
108. Dennis R. Nolan. Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of 
lmellectuallmpact. 51 NEW YORK U L. REV. 731 (1976). For a positive evaluation of Blackstone's 
impact on Arne1ican politics. sec DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 169-190 (1938) 
109. Doolittle, supra note 106, at 99. 
110. PALL M. HAMLIN. LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YoRK 64-65 (1939), quoted in 
Nolan, supra note I 08, at 737. 
Ill. Nolan, supra note I 08, at 748, quotes Lincoln saying, "I never read anything which so 
profoundly interested and thrilled me." (Citin!{ James M. Ogden, Lincoln's Early Impressions of the 
Law in Indiana, 7 NOTRE DAME L REV .. 325, 325-29 (1932)). 
112. For example, Rene Cassian and Charles Malik, important leaders in the development of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights saw these rights built on the Ten Commandments. JOHN 
WARWICK MONTGOMERY, HUMAN RIGI!TS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, 275, n. 23 (1986) This was 
confirmed when I attended the lnstitut International des Droits de /'Homme (International Institute 
of Human Rights) at the University of Strasbourg in July, 1998. Two of the speakers - Professor 
Boyle of the University of Essex and Professor M. Camille Kuyu Mwissa of the Catholic University 
of Central Africa and University of Paris - specifically acknowledged the dependence of the 
Declaration on Christian views, though Professor Boyle explained that resistance from Marxist 
countries caused the Framers to make the language ambiguous; other examples exist in the 
development of criminal law (see Witte and Arthur, supra note 80, at 433), tort law (see Cook, 
supra note 81), and contract law (see Harold J. Berman, The Reli!{ious Sources ol General Contract 
Law: An Historical Perspective I 03, 4 J. L. & RELIGION (1986)), to mention only a few 
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namely the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the 
United States. It is thought that the Declaration was written from purely an 
enlightenment perspective relying on natural law and that the Constitution 
is a totally secular document, intentionally so, to avoid the types of 
religious divisions 113 that occurred in the lands from which they came. 
We have already seen how John Locke was an important figure for the 
War for Independence114 but after this period his writings gained little 
hearing. 115 The people were moving to the matter of how to structure this 
new government that began in 1776. Other sources were used in the 
political rhetoric of the day. 116 The most quoted book of the period from 
1760-1805 in the political writings of the day was the book of 
Deuteronomy (the law book), in the Bible, accounting for thirty-four 
percent of all the quotes. 117 The person, after Montesquieu, who was most 
quoted in the era immediately before and after the drafting of the 
Constitution was Blackstone 118 and almost as much as Locke during the 
period leading up to the Declaration. 119 
Several key statements of the Declaration may reflect Blackstonian 
thought. The phrase "Jaws of nature and of nature's God" 120 particularly 
reminds one of Blackstone's emphasis on this two-fold view of law. 
Following Burlamaqui and Pufendorf. Blackstone saw nature as having 
certain laws established by God which expressed the will of God and were 
superior to any contrary law made by men: 121 
113. See Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 961-62. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 83-83. 
115. Lutz, supra note 104, at 192-193. 
116. See infra APPENDIX for graphs of the thinkers and sources quoted during the period of 
1760-1805. 
117 Lutz, supra note l 04, says: 
Anyone familiar with the literature will know that most of these citations come from 
sermons reprinted as pamphlets; hundreds of sermons were repnnted during the era, 
amounting to at least l 0% of all pamphlets published. These reprinted sermons accounted 
for almost three-fourths of the biblical citations, making this nonsermon source of biblical 
citations roughly as important as the Classical or Common Law categories. 
/d. at 192. 
118. D.S Lutz and C.S. Hyneman reviewed 15,000 items in the political writings between 
1760-1805, reading closely 2,200 with explicitly political content. Included were all books, pamphlets, 
newspaper articles, and monographs printed for public consumption. Lutz, supra note l 04, at 191; 
see also AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805 (Charles S. Hyneman 
and Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
119. He is quoted more than two and one-half times that of Locke (see APPENDIX for chart). 
Probably this is because his writings are strong on governmental process, operation, and interaction 
of institutions. 
120. The Declaration of Independence para. l (U.S. 1776). 
121. This latter idea has been held by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Samuel Rutherford in Lex 
Rex, and adopted by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. King cites Aquinas saying, "An unjust law is a 
human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law." MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE 
CAN'T WAIT 85 (1964). Also he writes, "All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation 
distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of inferiority . 
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[W]hen the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created 
matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon 
that matter, from which it can never depart, and without 
which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into 
motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all 
moveable bodies must conform. 122 
Consequent to this initial postulate of Blackstone, he continues: 
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to 
the laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent 
being .... And, consequently, as man depends absolutely upon 
his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should in all 
points conform to his Maker's will. 
This will of his Maker is called the law of Nature. For as 
God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of 
mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction 
of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with 
free-will to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down 
certain immutable laws of human nature .... These are the 
eternal, immutable laws of good and evil. 123 
Since God's laws in nature are preeminent over human laws, human 
laws are invalid when in conflict with them: 
This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and 
dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to 
any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and 
at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to 
this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all 
their authority mediately or immediately, from this original. 124 
Blackstone did not only consider the "laws of nature" as a standard of 
law for human laws to conform, he viewed the divine law, the Holy 
Scriptures as even a clearer standard: 
[I]f our reason were always, as in our first ancestor [Adam] 
before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by 
segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and 
sinful." !d. at 85. Ironically, "[t]he late Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen stated that an unjust law 
is a contradiction in terms. because it is law itself that sets the standard for what is just. Indeed, 
although Kelsen was Jewish, the anti-Semite Hitler availed himself of Kelsen' s arguments in setting 
up his totalitarian system." Brown, supra note 62, at 123. 
122. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 38-39. 
123. !d. at 39. 
124. !d. at 41. 
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passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or 
intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should 
need no other guide but this [i.e., the law of nature]. But every 
man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his 
reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and 
error. 
This has given manifold occasion for the benign 
interposition of divine providence; which, in compassion to the 
frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, 
hath been pleased ... to discover and enforce its laws by an 
immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered 
we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found 
only in the holy scriptures .... These precepts [the ones 
written in the holy Scriptures] ... , when revealed, are found 
on comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, 
as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we 
are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these 
truths was attainable by reason, in its present corrupted state; 
since we find that, until they were revealed [in writing], they 
were hid from the wisdom of the ages. As then the moral 
precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those 
of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal 
strength and perpetuity .125 
Titus explains the practical outworking of Blackstone's comments: 
In other words, God's putting in written form, "Thou shalt not 
murder" (Ex. 20:13) did not make murder wrong, but His 
putting the rule in writing revealed more effectively to fallen 
people the original law protecting the sanctity of human life 
that God had placed and revealed in the created order from 
the beginning. Murder was wrong, therefore, because it was 
contrary to the nature of people and to the very nature of 
God's creation. 126 
How did Blackstone view the disobedience to a human law that came 
into conflict with God's law in nature or Scripture? He walked in the train 
of many before him: "Nay, if any human law should allow or injoin us to 
commit it [an act contrary to divine or natural law], we are bound to 
transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the 
125. /d. at 41-42, quoted in Herbert W. Titus, God's Revelation: Foundation for the Common 
Law, in THE CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW: CHRISTIANITY'S IMPACT ON AMERICA'S FOUNDING 
DOCUMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTION 19-20 (H. Wayne House ed., 1998). 
126. Titus, supra note 125, at 20. 
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divine." 127 One can readily see that young men reading Blackstone, 
coupled with the thinking of Locke, could easily be led to confront 
England who seemed to place itself above just laws in dealing with the 
colonies. 
Blackstone may not be the only Christian influence on the Declaration. 
According to Gary Amos, the Declaration is not merely a theistic 
document, that few could dispute, but is distinctly Christian in nature: 
"When we examine the terminology, argument, and logical structure of the 
Declaration, we find them to be consistent with the Bible and Christian 
teaching." 128 This is in stark contrast to the pervasive influence of Carl 
Becker, whose ideas on the primary enlightenment influence on the 
Declaration has held sway for seventy years. 129 I am compelled by the 
arguments of Amos that the primary influence on the Declaration was 
Christian in nature, but certainly not devoid of those enlightenment 
influences of men like Locke whose enlightenment thinking was tempered 
(the reason I have called it conservative above) with the Christian 
worldview and biblical guidance. This is notwithstanding the contribution 
to the Declaration by Jefferson. But we must bear in mind that a committee 
wrote the Declaration, not Jefferson alone, and that the Declaration is not a 
person letter of Jefferson to King George; it is a statement from the 
colonists, 130 and written with that in mind, who were almost entirely 
Christian, and written to the King and England, who also were Christian. 
Edward Humphrey's listing of Christian terminology is convincing 
that the Declaration and other documents of the time reflecting 
Protestantism. 
The multiplicity of references to the Deity in the 
Declaration reflects similar invocations in the proclamations 
and other state papers of the Continental Congress. These 
unabashedly exhibited a belief in Trinitarian Protestantism. 
Congress continually invoked, as sanction for its acts, the 
name of "God," "Almighty God," "Nature's God," "God of 
Armies," "Lord of Hosts," "His Goodness," "God's 
127. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122 at 40. 
128. GARY AMOS, DEFENDING THE DECLARATION: How THE BIBLE AND CHRISTIANITY 
INFLUENCED THE WRITING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 128 (1989). See also Gary Amos. 
The Philosophical and Biblical Perspectives That Shaped the Declaration of Independence, in TilE 
CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAw 49-82. See discussion of the Christian nature of the Declaration in 
Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 969. 
129. See BECKER, supra note 83. 
130. Lutz, supra note 84, at 36. "Contrary to popular belief today, Jefferson did not write the 
Declaration of Independence de novo. As Jefferson himself later explained, he pieced it together from 
the political literature of his time to 'reflect the American mind.' " !d. al n. 18 (alluding to 
Jefferson's Jetter to Henry Lee on May 8, 1825, 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 343 (P 
Leicester Ford ed. I 899)). 
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Superintending Providence," "Providence of God," 
"Providence," "Supreme and Universal Providence," 
"Overruling Providence of God," "Creator of All," "Indulgent 
Creator," "Great Governor of the World," "The Divinity," 
"Supreme Disposer of All Events," "Holy Ghost," "Jesus 
Christ," "Christian Religion," "Free Protestant Colonies," and 
other expressions of devout Christian Protestantism. 1.31 
237 
The Constitution, as well, is a document that reflects a Christian 
worldview. Let me be clear, the Constitution is a federal document, first of 
all, seeking to provide a structure to a government begun with the 
Declaration, and limiting the power of the government in deference to 
individual state governments. 132 It is not a theological document or creed, 
so largely absent of such terminology. 133 At the same time it is not an anti-
Christian document either. 134 One would be surprised to find, in a 
document like the Constitution, terms as found in the Declaration, but 
there are internal signs of the influence of Christian ideas in the 
Constitution that many in the early days of the Republic sought to 
demonstrate. 135 For my purpose, it is sufficient to mention but a few 
examples of Christian influence to illustrate that Christianity and the 
federal government are not intended to be at opposite poles or separated by 
a high and impenetrable wall. 136 
Before the drafting and passage of the First Amendment guaranteeing 
"free exercise" of religion, the Constitution had already contained 
provisions for such a doctrine. The Constitution provides in Article VI that 
"no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
131 EDWARD FRANK HUMPHREY, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN AMERICA, 1774-1789 407 
(1924 ), quoted in Leo Pfeffer, The Deity in American Constitutional Histmy, 23 J. CHURCH & STATE 
215. 217 (1981). 
132. Approximately half of the delegates to the federal convention of 1787 had been 
representatives at their state conventions where the documents were replete with religious references. 
In the federal (not national) constitution, such references are largely, though not totally omitted, since 
none really believed that the federal government should be involved in furtherance of religion, leaving 
this alone for the state to determine. David E. Maas, The Philosophical and Theological Roots of 
the Religious Roots of the Religious Clause in LIBERTY AND LAW: AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT !, 
7 (Ronald A. Wells & Thomas A. Askew eds., 1987). 
133. For a discussion of reasons why some believe statements regarding God and the Christian 
religion are omitted from the Constitution, see Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 955-964. 
134. For the various type of explicit and implicit references to God and the Christian religion 
m the Constitution, see id. at 964-994. 
135. For example, Knicely, at supra note 25, at 265, indicates the position of Jasper Adams, 
strong advocate for the Christian nature of the Constitution: 
The failure to express more sympathy to religion in the Constitution, however, was in 
Adam's view by design, just as the Constitution left unstated other fundamental truths, 
such as the inalienable rights of the people, the political sovereignty of the people, and 
the right of the people to resist and abolish tyranny. !d. 
136. See generally JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION ( 1987). 
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public Trust under the United States."137 Such a statement was not denying 
religious tests in the various states, however, for 
[m]any in the founding generation supported a federal test ban 
because they valued religious tests required under state laws, 
and they feared a federal test might displace existing state test 
oaths and religious establishments. Even among the most 
ardent proponents of Article VI, few denied the advantage of 
placing devout Christians in public office."138 
A second provision relating to oaths was the matter of taking oaths. 
Certain Christians would not take oaths, for religious reasons, such as the 
Quakers, so the authors deferred to them in the writing of the document by 
adding "affirmation." Oaths in the eighteenth century carried religious 
import, a solemn statement before the Supreme Being and affirmation 
carried the same idea. 139 Michael McConnell properly observes that these 
two elements - no religious tests and the affirmation exception to the 
taking of oaths - "reflect a spirit and purpose similar to that of the (First 
Amendment's) free exercise clause."140 Another minor implicit indication 
of the Framers concession of Christianity in the Constitution is providing 
for a Sunday exception in the signing of legislation. 141 
Two explicit examples of Christian ideas in the Constitution are the 
mention of the "year of our Lord" in Article VII, and the recognition of the 
Declaration as the proper preamble to the Constitution. Regarding Article 
VII, there is no question that this dating method was the common method 
in the Christian west and was used regularly on official documents. Unlike 
the French calendar, which began a new calendar with the revolution, 142 
the colonists maintained association with their Christian past. Such 
continuance, though significant to many nineteenth commentators, 143 gives 
but a small benefit to the Christian nature of the Constitution. More 
significant. in my opinion is the argument that the Declaration is the 
preamble to the Constitution, so that the documents, though different in 
nature, serve as one organic whole. 
I 37. For the meaning of the oath and religious test in the Constitution see Maas, supra note 
132. at 1-23. 
138. Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 951. 
139. See 1d. at 981-986. 
140. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding o{ Free exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1473 (1990), quoted in Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 983. 
141. See Dreisbach, supra note 55 at 974-75. 
142. !d. at 965-96. 
143. !d. at 966. 
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The Declaration of Independence, an unarguably theistic, if not 
Christian document, may be understood as the preamble to the 
Constitution. As Donald Lutz says, 
After approving the Declaration, the Continental Congress turned to 
writing a national constitution. The Articles of Confederation that 
resulted proved defective in important respects. As a result, the new 
Constitution of 1787 replaced the Articles. The Declaration, however, 
continued to stand as the preface to the American national compact. The 
Constitution begins, "We the people of the United States, in order to 
create a more perfect union." The people already exist, and exist in a 
political union. This can be only if there is a first part to a compact of 
which the Constitution is the second part. There is no document that can 
be pointed to as fulfilling such a role other than the Declaration of 
Independence. To say that we live under a national compact of which the 
Declaration is the first part may sound a bit strange at first, but it would 
be stranger still to have begun our national bicentennial in 1976 if the 
Declaration of Independence was not part of our national founding. 144 
Another line of argument that demonstrates the relationship between 
these two documents is found in the Constitution itself. The Constitution, 
in several places, connects the founding of the government with the 
Declaration of the Independence, and upon which its relies for its 
philosophical foundation. 
The first line of evidence, however, is from the Declaration itself. The 
heading to the Declaration is "The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen 
United States of America." 145 The document, then, portends to come from 
the "one people" of the United States of America, though of course the 
manner in which the states will relate to each other is uncertain until after 
the ratification of the Constitution in 1791. They wanted the world to 
know that they were a new nation, rightly independent of England. 
Second, the Declaration toward the end concludes, "We, therefore, the 
representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress, 
assembled."146 
The Constitution written in 1787 was "for" the nation already formed 
in 1776. Further evidence that this was the way the Framers of the 
Constitution viewed the situation is found within the Constitution itself. 147 
144. Lutz, supra note 84, at 37. See also Dennis J. Mahoney, The Declaration of independence 
as a Constitutional Document, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 54. 65 
(Leonard W Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (arguing that the Declaration of Independence 
"is the real preamble to the Constitution") (cited in Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 184) 
145. The Declaration of Independence, heading (U.S. 1776). 
146. The Declaration of Independence, para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
147. I am indebted for some of these observations to an unpublished paper by Cannada. 
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Article I, §2(2), requires that the representatives must have been "seven 
years a citizen of the United States"148 before holding office. Such a 
requirement presupposed the existence of the nation in order for the House 
of Representatives to convene in 1789. A similar example is found 
regarding senators in Article I, §3(3) but "nine years a citizen of the 
United States .... " 149 Unless the government already existed, they would 
need to wait nine years to meet after 1789. One more qualification clause 
is used with similar import, that of President. The pertinent clause reads 
(Art. II, § 1 (5)), "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
eligible to the office of President ... and been fourteen years a resident 
within the United States."15° Cannada elucidates on this: 
Clearly, this provision recognizes that there could a 
"natural born citizen" at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution and thus "citizenship" did exist prior to the time 
of the adoption of the Constitution. It is also interesting to 
note that the "residence" requirement went even beyond the 
date of the Declaration and that the term "resident" was used 
rather than the term "Citizen". There was no such thing as a 
Citizen until the nation was established and that was done by 
the adoption of the Declaration. 151 
The last indication of the existence of the United States from the time 
of the Declaration is found at the very end of the Constitution. It 
concludes, "DONE in convention by the unanimous consent of the states 
present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one 
thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the twelfth." The unanimous consent was from 
"states present" at the Declaration. 
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution worked 
together to provide the soul and the body of the law for the proper ordering 
of society, maintaining morality and civility for the majority of the nation's 
governmental history. These documents should not be separated. The 
Declaration sets forth the principles upon which the government of the 
nation was to be founded, whereas the Constitution establishes the civil 
powers to accomplish the principles of the Declaration. In view of this, the 
Constitution cannot be viewed as absent the theological ideas that 
permeate the Declaration. This perspective gives meaning to the words of 
Inalienable RiRhts and the Declaration of" Independence 6-7 (1992). 
148. U.S. Const. art. I, §2(2). 
149. U.S. Const. art. I, §3(3). 
150. U.S Const. art. II, §1(5). 
151. Cannada, supra note 147, at 6. 
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John Quincy Adams who said, "The highest glory of the American 
Revolution was this; it connected in one indissoluble bond the principles 
of civil government with the principles of Christianity"152 and "From the 
day of the Declaration ... they (the American people) were bound by the 
laws of God, which they all, and by the laws of The Gospel, which they 
nearly all, acknowledge as the rules of their conduct."153 
One last example puts the coup d'grace on this argument. Cannada 
illustrates: 
[I]t is significant that as states were subsequently admitted 
into the Union the statutes admitting such admission provided 
that they would be admitted with "equal footing" or to the 
"same footing" as the original states. In fact, the admission 
statutes for thirteen states, including the states of Alaska in 
1958 and of Hawaii in 1959, contained language such as that 
their respective Constitutions "shall be republican in form ... 
and not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States 
and the principles of the Declaration of Independence." Thus 
we have Congress, as late as 1959, protecting the structure of 
the government of this nation .... 154 
Accordingly, each state in the union, with the exception of Oregon, 
specifically make reference to either Almighty God, the Supreme Ruler of 
the Universe, God, Creator, or Supreme Being, being consistent with the 
Declaration, upon whom the principles of the Declaration rely. 155 
5. The Reformation doctrine of the two kingdoms 
The Founders of the United States shared many theological points in 
common with the Reformers that gave rise to the Protestant Reformation. 
Views of God, the sinfulness of man, kinds of church government, and the 
use of covenant, among others, were shared by this generally homogenous 
group of men. They were largely Calvinists, influenced by some 
enlightenment thinking, and well versed in the history, politics, and 
philosophy of the past. 156 
Rather than entering into these matters, I would like to suggest one 
area in which the Reformation influenced the nature of church and state, 
I 52. THORNTON, supra note 2, quoted in FEDERER, supra note 2, at I 8. 
153. !d. 
154. Cannada, supra note 147, at 7. 
155. For example, California, the state of my citizenship has in its preamble, "We, the People 
of the State of California, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure and 
perpetuate its blessings, do establish this Constitution." CALIFORNIA CONST. preamble (amend. Nov. 
5. 1996) 
156. See EIDSMOE, supra note 136, at 17-38. 
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which I believe, had major impact on the formation of the American 
system of government: the doctrine of the two kingdoms. 
The doctrine of the two kingdoms is first seen in the history of the 
kingdom of Israel. Though Israel is commonly thought of as a theocracy 
(the direct rule of God) in reality it appears to be more like a constitutional 
monarchy. The king himself was under the covenant that Yahweh made 
with Israel (Ex. 19), and the king, unlike the "ruler cults" of the ancient 
world157 could not legally enter into the functions of the cultus. The 
clearest example of this prohibition is found in the confrontation between 
Samuel and Israel's first king, Saul. Samuel, the prophet-priest of Yahweh, 
took longer to come to Gilgal to offer a sacrifice than Saul thought 
advisable so he offered the sacrifice himself. Due to this Yahweh cut Saul 
and his line from the kingship (I Sam 13). Another example is King 
Uzziah who attempted to bum incense at the altar of God. Because of this 
Yahweh inflicted him with leprosy which remained with him the rest of his 
life (2 Chron. 26:16-21). One might say that Yahweh created a wall of 
separation between the religious cultus of Israel and the state, though it 
was never intended to be a separation of Yahweh and state. 
The doctrine of separate kingdoms was first explicated by Jesus Christ. 
When he was approached by certain Jewish leaders regarding whether one 
should pay taxes to Caesar or not (Luke 20:22) he uttered the famous 
statement: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the 
things that are God's" (Luke 20:25). Jesus thereby acknowledged that the 
state had legitimacy and a jurisdiction, though all things belong to God. 
Lord Acton speaks to these words of Christ: 
When Christ said "Render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's," He gave to 
the State a legitimacy it had never before enjoyed, and set 
bounds to it that had never yet been acknowledged. And He 
not only delivered the precept but He also forged the 
instrument to execute it. To limit the power of the State ceased 
to be the hope of patient, ineffectual philosophers and became 
the perpetual charge of a universal church. 158 
The other major New Testament presentation of the two kingdoms is 
found in the letter of the apostle Paul to the Romans, though the emphasis 
there is on the kingdom of the left (to use Luther's designation): 
Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For 
there is no authority except from God, and the authorities that 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63. 
158. EIDSMOE. supra note 17, at Ill (quotinK Gertrude Hirnrnelfarh 45 ( 1955)) 
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exist are appointed by God. Therefore whoever resists the 
authority resists the ordinance of God, and those who resist 
will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers are not a terror 
to good works, but to evil. Do you want to be unafraid of the 
authority? Do what is good, and you will have praise from the 
same. For he is God's minister to you for good. But if you do 
evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is 
God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who 
practices evil. 159 
243 
The apostle indicates that the power of the state is not by human 
design but by divine, to the point that Christians were to obey the civil 
ruler, at Paul's time the Roman emperor Nero, 160 though this obedience 
was not absolute, 16 I articulated first by the apostle Peter on the loyalties of 
the Christian when it seeks to place the duty of the Christian to God over 
against that of the state. 162 
All of these biblical texts set forth the teachings that the powers of the 
state are legitimate, since ordained by God, but that they are limited in 
scope to those areas instituted by God and separate from the duties 
imposed by God on the religious community and religious individual. 
Michael McConnell explains the importance of this theological construct: 
While theological in its origin, the two-kingdoms idea lent 
powerful support to a more general liberal theory of 
government, because once the government could be limited in 
one respect, it could be limited in others. The state could no 
longer be understood as omnicompetent. This idea provided 
probably the most important counterweight to the common 
Enlightenment belief that the best form of government was 
enlightened despotism. It can be argued that of the two great 
intellectual upheavals of the early modern period, the 
Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation, the latter was 
the more significant for the advance of political liberty. Of 
course, much blood was spilled for conscience - not least by 
Protestants - before these implications of Protestant doctrine 
became apparent and ultimately dominant."163 
159. Romans 13:1-4 (NKJV) 
160. See R.C SPROUL, The Biblical View o{ Subnussion to Constituted Authority, in THE 
CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW 126-138 (H WAYNE HOUSE ed., 1998) 
161. See H. WAYNE HOUSE, The Christian's Duty o{ Civtl Disobedience to the Government: 
Contemporary StruJ?gfes Between Christians and the State, m THE CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW 
139-174 (H. WAYNE HOUSE ed, 1998). 
162. See Acts 4:19. 
163. McConnell, supra note 39, at 168-169. McConnell likewise notes that "The two-kingdoms 
view of competing authorities is at the heart of our First Amendment." !d. at 169. 
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Though Christians have generally held to a two-kingdoms doctrine 
from the initiation of the church and the teaching we have observed from 
the Scriptures, there has been disagreement on how this doctrine should be 
understood and what jurisdiction the church and state held in respect to 
each other. 
Catholic theologians have generally recognized a difference between 
the church and the state- the two kingdoms (to use Luther's terminology) 
- but have usually viewed the church as the greater of the two. 164 The 
reasoning for the church as greater than the state largely rests on the 
perspective of Augustine. He argued for the superiority of the church since 
it is etemal and the state temporal, and because the church must answer to 
God for the conduct of the state. The two kingdoms, or two swords, 
perspective was given by Pope Boniface VII in his papal bull, Unam 
Sanctum, in A. D. 1304: 
We are told by the word of the gospel that in this His fold 
there are two swords, - a spiritual, namely, and a temporal. 
For when the apostles said "Behold here are two swords" -
when, namely, the apostles were speaking in the church- the 
Lord did not reply that this was too much, but enough. Surely 
he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter 
wrongly interprets the word of the Lord when He says: "Put up 
thy sword in its scabbard." Both swords, the spiritual and the 
material, therefore, are in the power of the church; the one, 
indeed, to be wielded for the church, the other by the church; 
the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of 
kings and knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest. 
One sword, moreover, ought to be under the other, and the 
temporal authority to be subjected to the spiritual. For when 
the apostle says "there is no power but of God, and the powers 
that are of God are ordained," they would not be ordained 
unless sword were under sword and the lesser one, as it were, 
were led by the other to great deed. 165 
In contrast to the Roman Catholic view, Luther saw the church and 
state to be neither superior nor inferior to the other, but both as being 
created by God to different purposes. He viewed the state as being 
responsible to restrain evil. Believers belong to both kingdoms, the church 
164. This section on the diflerent theories of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran. Cah·inist. and 
Anabaptist perspectives on the relation of church and state is largely drawn from my discussion in 
H. WAYNE HOUSE, CIIRISTIAI\ MINISTRIES AND THE LAW: WHAT CHURCH AND PARA-CilliRCH 
LEADERS SHOULD KNOW 34-37 (1992). 
165. EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 112 (quoting Pope Boniface VIII, Unum Sanctum, 1304 A.D. 
printed in E. F HENDERSON, SELECT HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 43)-37 ( 196))) 
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and the state, and have responsibilities to each. Luther believed that 
believers relate to the first kingdom, the church, by faith, and to the second 
kingdom, the state, by reason. 166 
Luther, unlike Calvin, did not believe that Christians had the right to 
use the state to promote Christianity. Christians who were in government 
should use Christian principles in government only inasmuch as the 
principles could also be justified by reason. Even a prudent but evil ruler is 
to be preferred to an imprudent but virtuous ruler, since the latter may 
bring ruin to the state while the former at least may resist evil. 167 
Calvin believed that the state's authority came from God and that this 
authority came directly from God and not through the church, unlike 
Roman Catholics. He accepted the legitimate separations of these spheres: 
For the Church has no power of the sword to punish or 
coerce, no authority to compel, no prisons, fines, or other 
punishments like those inflicted by civil magistrates. Besides, 
the object of this power is not that he who has transgressed 
may be punished against his will, but that he may profess his 
repentance by a voluntary submission to chastisement. 168 
Even though Calvin had no difficulty with the government 
maintaining the official public church, he did believe in limiting 
government's activity in reference to religion. This recognition between 
the separate jurisdictions of the church and the state caused Calvin to 
express a view strikingly similar to that found in the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause: 
Nor let anyone think it strange that I now refer to human 
polity the change of the due maintenance of religion which I 
may appear to have placed beyond the jurisdiction of men. For 
I do not allow men to make laws respecting religion and the 
worship of God now, any more than I did before: though I 
approve of civil government which provides that the true 
religion which is contained in the law of God be not violated, 
and polluted by public blasphemies with impunity. 169 
166. Luther has often been viewed as placing reason and faith at opposite poles. See House, 
for a discussion of how Luther used the term ratio. House, Luther's View of Apologetics, 7 
CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL J. 65 ( 1981 ). 
167 Luther is purported to have said that he would rather have a "competent Turk rule than 
an incompetent Christian." (quoted in DAVID W. HALL, SAVIOR OR SERVANT? PUTTING GOVERNMENT 
IN ITS PLACE 210 (1996)). 
168. JOHN CALVIN, I INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 116, quoted in PHILIP KURLAND 
AND RALPH LERNER, 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 44 (1987) [hereinafter FOUNDER'S]. 
169. Fm•NDER'S, supra note 168, at 44. 
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It may very well be that the framers picked up Calvin's words "laws 
respecting religion", since his thinking and writings were ever present 
among the predominant Calvinist colonists. These colonists also sought to 
extend "freedom of conscience," believing that every person should 
worship God "according to his own conscience."170 
This view of Calvin had already found a firm footing in England. King 
James II saw a need for toleration of religious sects, as evidenced in his 
letter to Thomas Dongan in 1682, where he used the phrase, "free 
exercise" of religion: 171 
You shall permit all persons of what religion soever quietly 
to inhabit within your government without giving them any 
disturbance or disquiet whatsoever for or by reasons of their 
differing opinions in matters of Religion, provided they give no 
disturbance to ye public peace, nor do molest or disquiet others 
in ye free Exercise of their Religion.172 
A couple of examples in the early colonies of America provide further 
evidence that the doctrine of the two kingdoms had found root, with its 
implications of religious freedom. In a charter that Pennsylvania agreed 
upon with England in 1682 a reciprocal duty of free exercise was 
guaranteed: 
persons that hold themselves obliged in conscience to live 
peaceable and justly in Civil Society [would] in no ways be 
molested or prejudiced for their religious persuasion or 
practice, in matters of faith and worship, nor shall they be 
compelled at any time, to frequent or maintain any religious 
worship, place or ministry whatever. m 
Even with this liberality toward religious conscience, though, William 
Penn, in that charter, required one common element, "faith in Jesus 
Christ."174 
Massachusetts Christians also followed the thinking of John Calvin, at 
least in regards to other Christians being in their midst: "If any people of 
other nations professing the true Christian Religion shall flee to us from 
the Tyranny or oppression of their persecutors or from famine, wars or the 
like necessary and compulsory cause, they shall he entertained and 
170. !d. 
171. FouNDER's supra note 168, at 52 (quotinK King James II Instructions to Governor 
Thomas Dungan). 
172. !d. 
173. !d. (quotinK Pennsylvania Charter Of Liberty) 
174. !d. 
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succored amongst us, according to that power and prudence, god shall 
give us."175 The Rhode Island Baptist Roger Williams expanded this idea 
to argue that God did not demand uniformity in any civil state 176 and that 
nations should not pursue holy wars for Christianity but evangelize with 
the sword of the Spirit: 
It is the will and command of God, that since the coming of 
his Son the Lord Jesus, a permission of the most Paganish, 
Jewish, Turkish, or anti-Christian consciences and worship be 
granted to all man, in all nations and countries; and they are 
only to be fought against with that sword which is in soul-
matters able to conquer, to wit; the sword of the Spirit-the 
Word ofGod. 177 
The Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms, being under the authority 
of both the state and the church. The state's authority, however, is limited 
to the areas of authority given to it by God. If the state steps beyond its 
authority, its acts are without legitimacy and are lawless, to which 
authority believers owe no duty and should resist. These Calvinistic ideas 
generally set well with the purposes of the late 18th century colonists due 
to the thinking of Calvin being so pervasive in the thinking of most of the 
churches, and consequently the citizens. 178 
One other perspective on the relationship of church and state existed in 
the eighteenth century and before, the Anabaptist view. I will not be 
discussing it at any length and consider it but a minor significance for the 
present study. The Anabaptists (and some of their descendants) believed 
that the state was part of the evil world system ruled by Satan and thus 
Christians were to do all possible to remove themselves from it and its 
affairs. Thus Christians were not to vote, hold public office, serve in the 
armed forces, or be involved in government in any other way. Christians, 
generally, were to obey the state but the state had no real authority over 
Christians, nor did the church have any authority over unbelievers. 
Though the doctrine of two kingdoms was held differently by various 
Christian traditions- the perspective of Calvin probably was predominant 
in the New England colonies since virtually all the churches were 
Calvinistic in their views - the impact of the two kingdoms was ideally 
suited to the new form of government intended by the Framers. They 
desired a state limited in power and unable to reach the institutional 
175. FOUNDER'S, supra note 168, at 47 (quotin!( Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony 
in New England). 
176. FOlrNDER • s, supra note 168, at 48 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloody Tcnent of 
Persecution for Cause of Conscience). 
177. /d. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 112-55. 
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church. They did not want a Church of New England. Unfortunately, as 
subsequent analysis will demonstrate, the relationship between church and 
state, and between religious values and beliefs and the state have become 
more complicated in this century. 
III. CAUGHT IN THE MIRE: CAN THE SUPREME COURT EXTRICATE ITSELF 
FROM ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONFUSION? 
A. A Befuddled Court Presses on with Judicial Confidence but not with 
Judiciousness 
There is unprecedented confusion in the courts today regarding the 
interpretation and application of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. The First Amendment seems 
straightforward but has engendered considerable debate. The amendment 
reads simply, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. " 179 
Until the Everson 180 decision of 1947 the courts gave little 
consideration to the establishment prong and instead dealt with certain free 
exercise claims of minority religious groups that had arisen on American 
soil. 181 The general view of the courts of this land was that the first part of 
the amendment was forbidding Congress, the only law making body of the 
federal government, from establishing a national religion or preferring one 
religious group or religious tenets over other groups or doctrines. This 
seems to have been the understanding of those that actually wrote and 
adopted this amendment based on the debates and revisions that occurred 
in the summer and early fall of 1787. 182 
179. U.S CONST. amend. I. 
180. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US I (1947). 
181. The Mormon polygamy cases concerned religious practices that were viewed as being 
the tenets of mainline Christian beliefs (Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878); Late 
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S I (1890); 
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S 333 ( 1890)). whereas the Jehovah's Witnesses came under fire in several 
decisions over a variety of religious freedom issues (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 ( 1940); 
Jobin v. Opelika, 316 U.S 584 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S 105 (1943); Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis 310 US. 586 (!940); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S 158 (1944)) 
182. See rehearsal of history by the Court in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 US 
457, 465-471 (1892) 
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B. Seeing Through a Glass Darkly: How the Courts Have Interpreted 
the Establishment Clause 
"[T}heir legislature should 'make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church & 
State."183 
Thomas Jefferson 
"I must admit, moreover, that it may not be easy, in every 
case, to trace the line of separation, between the right of 
Religion & the Civil authority, with such distinctness, as to 
avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points."184 
James Madison 
But when a man's fancy gets astride on his reason, when 
imagination is at cuffs with the senses, and common 
understanding, as well as common sense, is kicked out of 
doors, the first proselyte he makes is himself; and when that is 
once compassed, the difficulty is not so great in bringing over 
others. 185 
Jonathan Swift 
How then did we get to the current constitutional malaise we observe 
today? In 194 7, the United States Supreme Court embarked on a course 
that would prove both controversial and, at times, paradoxical when it 
decided the seminal Everson v. Board of Education case. 180 The case 
purported to be consistent with the Framer's understanding of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment187and the Court, for the first 
time in its history, found the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
to be applicable to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. 188 
183. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and 
Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of Connecticut, I 
January 1802, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 
I. Box 89, 2 December 1801-1 January 1802; Presidential Papers Microfilm, Thomas Jefferson 
Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series I, Reel 25, 15 November 1801-31 March 
1802, quoted in Dreisbach, supra note 17, at I; (emphasis added). 
184. DANIEL DREISBACII, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 157 (quoting 
Madison). 
185. JONATHAN SWIFr, A Tale of a Tub, in I THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY Of ENGLISH 
LITERATURE (Abrams et a!., eds. 1979). 
186. 330 U.S. I (1947). 
187. !d. at II. 
188. "The First Amendment, as made applicable by the Fourteenth, commands that a 'state 
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". 
/d. at 8. Although this is the first instance the Court makes the establishment clause applicable, it 
is not the first case in which the Court deals with an establishment issue. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 
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Since this case, many have criticized, 189 and others praised,190 the Court's 
application of the Establishment Clause to state action. 
Whether initially legitimate or not, 191 the incorporation of the First 
Amendment via the Fourteenth IS now a permanent fixture of 
Constitutional law. However, now that the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause is part of the landscape, the question becomes one of 
its meaning and significance to claims brought under the clause; 192 
specifically, the proper model or test which ought to be used in 
Establishment Clause adjudication. 
In this portion of the article, I will first endeavor to establish the 
proper meaning of the Establishment Clause by examining the text itself, 
the Founder's intention, as informed by the study of history, and the 
historical precedent prior to Everson, insofar as practicable. 193 Second, I 
will examine Supreme Court decisions for both consistency with the 
meaning established in the preceding argument of this section and provide 
insight into a possible test for the Establishment Clause. Third, I will 
examine alternative models which have been suggested for examining the 
175 U S 291 ( 1899) (finding that money given through a federal appropriations act to construct 
buildings on a hospital grounds in the District of Columbia, owned by Sisters of Charity, did not 
violate the First Amendment since the purposes of the hospital were non-sectarian in nature); Rueben 
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (finding that moneys appropriated under ;1 trust fund 
established by Congress for the education of members of the Sioux tribe by the Bureau of Catholic 
Missions did not violate recent Congressional statutes prohibiting the use of congressional funds 
among the Indian tribes for sectarian purposes); and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education. 
281 U S 370 ( 1930) (upholding a Louisiana statute which provided for the purchase of books for 
children attending parochial school against a challenge that the Louisiana statute violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment by constituting a taking of private property for a private purpose). 
189. See CORD, supra note 17, at 109-133; WILLIAM H. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA l8o-189 (1964); MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, THE 
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
22 (1965); L ALLEN SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 298-300 ( 1972); G. 
BRADLEY. CH!IRCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (!987); and MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGIO~ 
AND POLITICS; TilE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978). 
190. A. A. STOKES & LEO. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 130-131 
(1964); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 131-133 (1967); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 187-189 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION 2 (1988); and ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987). 
19!. For a critique of the incorporation doctrine, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE 
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); and R. BORK, 
TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING Of· 
AMERICA (1989). 
192. I am employing these terms in a fairly specific way. The meaning of the text is that 
which is represented by the text and the significance is the relationship between the meaning and 
the facts at hand. See Jeffery A Aman and H. Wayne House, Constitutional Interpretation and The 
Question of Lawful Authority, 18 MEM. ST. L. R. I, 20-21 (1987), quoting E.D. HIRSCH, JR, 
VALIDITY [N INTERPRETATION (1967). 
193. The list of criteria given are in order of importance and have been adopted from Michael 
A Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment 
Clause Adjudication, til NOTRE DAME L. R. 311, at 325 (1986). 
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Establishment Clause along with a critique of these models utilizing the 
analysis developed in the proper meaning I have suggested. Last, I will 
conclude with a suggested approach that is consistent with my proposed 
understanding of the Establishment Clause and inclusive of tests examined 
in this portion. 
1. The meaning of the establishment clause in the First Amendment 
a. The text of the Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares, in 
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."194 The 
operative words in the Establishment Clause include "respecting," 
"establishment," and "religion." The word "respecting" implies that the 
types of laws that Congress cannot make about "an establishment of 
religion," would include both proscriptive and prescriptive legislation. 195 
One author has suggested that, in this "field" [e.g., "an establishment of 
religion"], "there was to be a total lack of legislative power insofar as 
Congress was concerned." 196 The term "respecting" is synonymous with 
"concerning, and regarding" which implies that the First Amendment did 
not prohibit an establishment of religion per se, it merely prohibited 
Congress from making any law "concerning or regarding an establishment 
of religion." 197 
The word "establishment," is synonymous with "institution," 
"organization," "business," "company," or "enterprise." Thus, an 
establishment of religion would be a religious organization, or institution. 
As it is shown infra, this definition is substantiated by the records covering 
the proposed versions of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. 198 
194. U.S. Const. amend I. 
19'\. Paulsen, supra note 193, at 321. See also CORD, supra note 17, at 9 and 2'\. 
196. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS I 04 (1957). The author makes an interesting 
point in footnote 5, which accompanies the text, wherein he states that the "exertion of federal 
Judicial power to make the First Amendment applicable to the states, by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause would undoubtedly have shocked the framers of the Bill of Rights." 
The reason for this lies in the nature of invoking the establishment clause. When the Supreme Court 
does so, it prohibits establishment of religion by the state, an activity outside the realm of 
Congressional power. The exercise of federal judicial power beyond the legislative authority of 
Congress was condemned in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938), as 
unconstitutional usurpation. 
197. CORD, supra note 17, at 9. 
198. See infra note 247; and see EIDSMOE, supra note l7 at 130-132. 
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This concept of "establishment" is linked inseparably with the term 
religion in the Establishment Clause. 199 Yet the shifting meaning of the 
term religion in the First Amendment has made it difficult for the Court 
over the years to determine exactly what is not to be established by the 
Congress. This failure to adequately define "religion" makes one wonder 
whether we are at the conundrum of Justice Stewart who said that he could 
not define obscenity but he knew it when he saw it. 200 Note the words of 
Judge Augustus N. Hand in Kauten: 
It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the 
content of the term is found in the history of the human race 
and is incapable of compression into a few words. Religious 
belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a 
means of relating the individual to his fellow-men in the most 
primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It accepts 
the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief 
finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires 
the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept 
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets. 201 
The Second Circuit, in Kauten, on the one hand, says that there is no 
need to "attempt" a definition of religion. Then it turns immediately 
around and describes religion in opposition to reason. Religion supposedly 
relates to conscience and the willingness to self-sacrifice and even 
martyrdom. Two elements appear to exist under the definition given by the 
199. Although it is linked with the tenn "an establishment"' in the first clause, it is not in the 
second part or free exercise clause. This point of distinction has led many to search for a definition 
of religion that is compatible in free exercise and establishment clause analysis. For varying views 
see, Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. REv. 579; Note, 
Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 ( 1965 ); George 
C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEo. L. 
J. 1519 (1983); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 
(1984); Timothy L. Hall, The Sacred and Projime: A First Amendment Definition of Religion. 61 
TEX. L. REv. 805 (1982); Gail Mere!, The Protection of Individual Choice.· A Consistent 
Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment. 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805 ( 1978); Stanley 
Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233. 
at note 3 ( 1989). 
200. "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing 
so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." J acobellis 
v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). This approach to defining, or 
faining not to define, tenns is reflected also in Roe v. Wade, where Justice Blackmun, writing for 
the Court, felt it unnecessary to defend when life began (though this was the pivotal issue in 
balancing claims) and then defined it as not beginning until the third trimester. Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 159 (1973). This slight of hand in cases like religion, obscenity, and abortion may be 
difficult for Justices, but it is no excuse for making hard, and properly infonned, choices on their 
part. 
201. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (1943). 
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court: religion relates to irrationality202 and to willingness to die rather than 
transgress one's beliefs. Surely such is too limiting and even contradictory 
to a person's own religious faith. For example, the court has used 
examples of such martyrs "found in the history of the human race" as 
Martin Luther and Socrates. 203 This argument begs the question for how 
does the court know this is a necessary component of religion without first 
defining what a religion is. 204 This circular reasoning goes something like 
this: Martyrdom is religious because people who were religious were 
willing to be martyred. Would a soldier's willingness to die for the country 
he loves be an example of religious belief, or would the unwillingness of a 
person to die for his religious convictions demonstrate that he is not 
religious? A better definition of religion and religious is needed. 
A similar problem develops when one assumes that religion is pitted 
against reason. One might refer to Hebrews in the New Testament where 
the writer says, "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the 
evidence of things not seen."205 Such an understanding of "religion" or 
"religious" is inadequate. A person claiming no religion might be guided 
by a similar definition waiting for a presumed gift at Christmas. The New 
Testament also requires reason to explain religious experience: "always be 
ready to give a defense to everyone who asks you a reason for the hope 
that is in you, with meekness and fear."206 As well, the writers of the New 
Testament relied on objective criteria in deciding on the truthfulness of the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ,207 and disavowed beliefs absent credible 
evidence, 208 and considered less than objective truth to be a sign of moral 
failure. 209 
Placing the religious (faith-based) and the secular (reason-based) in 
juxtaposition minimalizes the importance of religion to the area of law. To 
202. SeeDmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L.REV. 
309, 329. The author suggests that "[t)he unique character of religion is brought about by its reliance 
on faith, rather than reason, as an allegedly valid means of cognition." !d. 
203. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708. The court stated: 
A religious obligation forbade Socrates, even in order to escape condemnation, to entreat 
his judges to acquit him. because he believed that it was their sworn duty to decide 
questions without favor to anyone and only according to law. Such an obligation impelled 
Martin Luther to nail his theses on the door of the church at Wittenburg and, when he 
was summoned before Emperor Charles and the Diet of Worms, steadfastly to hold his 
ground and to utter the oft quoted words: "I neither can nor will recant anything, since 
it is neither right nor safe to act against conscience. Here I stand. I cannot do other. God 
help me. Amen. 
204. M. Ayers, Is a Workable Definition of Religion Possible in a Pluralistic Society:', 8 
(unpublished paper on file with author). 
205. Hebrews II :I (NKJV). 
206. I Peter 3:15 (NKJV) 
207. I Corinthians 15:3-8. 
208. 2 Pet. 2:16, I Cor. 15:14. 
209. I Corinthians 15:15. 
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recognize, however, that all ideologies are based on unproved assumptions 
and that faith can be reasonable, is to develop a level playing field for 
religion and law. Paul Toscan rightly observes, 
[A]ll ideologies are fundamentally religious. They are 
grounded upon assumptions that are not susceptible of proof: 
they are matters of faith .... Secular ideas, it is contended, 
are premised on objective, verifiable, demonstrable data, while 
theistic notions are based on no data at all, or at best, data 
that is subjective, mystical, and nondemonstrable. Those who 
make this argument fail to see that mysticism, subjectivism, 
and faith undergird even the most objective of our knowledge 
and data, as well as our information-gathering methods. In the 
first place, all data must be interpreted: the bones, the 
numbers, the photos, the readings taken on delicate scientific 
equipment - all of the quantifiable and verifiable pieces take 
on meaning only when they are arranged within the meaning 
- giving framework of some hypothesis. Hypothesizing is, 
itself, a subjective, even mystical, process. 210 
A better definition of "religion" is needed for First Amendment 
analysis. In trying to decide on a definition to guide them in First 
Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has fluctuated between religion 
needing content and religion only needing aspiration. Early cases which 
recognized Christianity as the official religion of the country, and 
religion211 having content, gave way over the years to mere recognition that 
Americans are a religious people and our institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being,212 to finally, religion is an amorphous "belief" in some 
ultimate reality. 213 
210 Paul James Toscano. A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public 
School.1. 1979 B.Y.U. L REv. 177. 200) (quoted in Feofanov. supra note 202, at 331 ). 
211 In a letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams, Marshall acknowledged that 
One great object of the colonial charters was avowedly the propagation of the Christian 
faith. Means have been employed to accomplish this object. & those means have been 
used by government. 
No person, I believe. questions the importance of religion to the happiness of man even 
during his existence m this world. It has at all times employed his most serious 
meditation, & had a decided influence on his conduct. The American population is 
entirely Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be strange, 
indeed, if with such a people, or if institutions did not presuppose Christianity, & did not 
often refer to it. & exhibit relation:; with It. 
Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1883), in DREISBACH, supra note 184, at 113-
114. 
212. "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 ( 1952) (Douglas, J .). 
213. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S 
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One of the problems in finding a definition of religion for First 
Amendment adjudication is that the term religion never meant only one 
thing in the eighteenth century. At times the term refers to what would be 
understood today as a "denomination" or a religious body with rituals and 
doctrines, or more generally the Christian religion itself. In the words of 
Chief Justice John Marshall, "The American population is entirely 
Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be 
strange, indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose 
Christianity, & did not often refer to it, & exhibit relations with it. "214 
Madison, for example, in speaking of the meaning of religion in the 
First Amendment, uses it this way where he identifies Quakers and 
Mennonites as separate "religions" and in the next sentence, as 
"denominations" indicating that Madison considered the terms 
synonymous. 215 This is a typical use referring "to an institution with a 
recognized body of communicants who gather together regularly for 
worship, and accept a set of doctrines offering some means of relating the 
individual to what is taken to be the ultimate nature of reality."216 
At other times it speaks of morality and duties to the Creator,217 as 
found in the Northwest Ordinance, which in part reads, "[r]eligion, 
morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged."218 In this sense, then, religion refers to a person's views 
regarding his relationship with his Creator, and to the obligations that his 
relationship imposes on him "of reverence for his being and character, and 
of obedience to his will."219 
The preceding indicates that the term may indicate a religious 
denomination, with rituals and particular doctrines, or religious beliefs that 
direct one's acts toward God and others. Both of these perspectives may be 
seen in the statement of the Macintosh Court, which said, "We are a 
Christian people according to one another the equal right of religious 
freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the 
will of God. "220 
Yet identifying the American religion as Christian, and believing that 
Christian people will seek to obey the Creator, did not resolve any First 
333 ( 1970) 
214. Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1883), in DREISBACH, supra note 
184, at ll3-ll4. 
215. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE 
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 8-16 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973). 
216. W. Reese, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, s.v. "religion," 488. 
217. Northwest Ordinance, Section 14, Article 3, 1787. 
218 /d. 
219 Davis v. Beason, 133 US 333 (1890). 
220. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (l93l). 
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Amendment problems. During the early period of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court acknowledged the need to look outside the 
Constitution for a definition of religion. In the important Free Exercise 
case of Reynolds, the Court dealt with the claim of a Mormon regarding 
the matter of the religious practice of polygamy: 
Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the 
Territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of 
religion . . . . The word "religion" is not defined in the 
Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its 
meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to 
the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was 
adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the 
religious freedom which has been guaranteed.221 
In deciding what was a valid exercise of religion, the Court referred to 
the prevailing, and historic, practice of Christianity which did not consider 
polygamy as an element of religious free exercise. 
On this hearing we can only consider whether ... an offense 
was committed of which the territorial court had jurisdiction to 
try the defendant. And on this point there can be no serious 
discussion or difference of opinion. Bigamy and polygamy are 
crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries .. . 
They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation ... . 
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been 
seriously contended that the whole punitive power of the 
government for acts (i.e., polygamy), recognized by the general 
consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper 
matters for prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order 
that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be 
carried out without hindrance. 222 
My point for mentioning these cases is not to decide the prudence of 
the Court regarding whether Reynolds or Davis were decided rightly, but 
that the decision on the nature of a religious activity was based on the 
beliefs of Western Christianity and that the definition had content, rather 
than being merely subjective. Moving from this approach in the two 
polygamy cases mentioned here we may tum to Ballard,223 where the 
Court "significantly undermined the view expressed in Davis ... that 
221. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. at 162. 
222. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. at 333, 341-343 (1890). 
223. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S 7S (1944). 
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beliefs that 'offend the common sense of [Christian] mankind' are not 
religious. "224 
The Court, as subsequent analysis of Establishment Clause cases will 
reveal, seems to jostle 'between definitions for religions which have 
traditional theistic elements and views that seem to be little different from 
the basic beliefs that anyone and everyone in society might hold so that 
religion has been robbed of any protection from the state. 225 
John Eidsmoe provides a brief look at the stark changes in the 
definition of religion by the Court: 
1899, Holy Trinity: 
1951, Zorach: 
1961, Torcaso: 
1965, Seeger: 
" ... this is a Christian nation." 
"We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being." 
". . . neither can aid those religions 
based on a belief in the existence of 
God as against those religions founded 
on different beliefs." 
" ... whether a given belief that is 
sincere and meaningful occupies a 
place that is sincere and meaningful 
occupies a place in the life of its 
possessor parallel to that filled by the 
orthodox belief in God." 
The Court has thus moved from Christian, to religions 
presupposing a Supreme Being, to religions whether or not 
they believe in God, to whatever is meaningful to the 
individual. Most of the Founding Fathers would only shake 
their heads in disbelief.226 
Moreover, the inability of the court to give a definition of religion in 
the First Amendment has given rise to a number of inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions, some which border on silliness. This undermines 
the credibility and dignity of the Court. As we shall see below the fact that 
the Court has truly not settled on a reasonable meaning of the word 
224. See Comment. Bevond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31 
EMORY LJ. 973. 979 (1982). 
225. This is especially evident in the draft cases. In Kauten (133 F2d at 707) the Court 
distinguished between beliefs formed from religious training and beliefs only philosophical. In SeeJ<er 
(380 U.S. at 174) the Court required a broad theistic view of religion, while in Welsh (398 U.S 333. 
335 ( 1970). any belief that would be based on a view of ultimate reality was acceptable. By the 
latter definition the Court lost any serious distinction between strong personal views and religious 
faith. 
226. EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 151-152. 
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religion in the text of the First Amendment has caused them to adopt tests 
that often are strained and which fail to adequately serve between the 
interests of the state, the public sphere, and private religious interests. This 
inconsistency has been illustrated by the comments of Keith Fournier, 
which I have put into chart form for easy contrast: 227 
Constitutional Unconstitutional 
A state may lend to parochial school A State may not lend maps of the 
children geography textbooks that United States for use in geography 
contain maps of the United States. class at parochial schools. Meek v. 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 
U.S. 236 (1938). (1975). 
A state may lend a science book to A state may not lend a science kit. 
parochial school children. Wolman Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,249 (1977). 249 (1977). 
A state may lend textbooks on A State may not lend a film on 
American colonial history. Meek v. George Washington, or a film 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 354-55, n.3 projector to show it in history class. 
- 4 (1975). Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 
354-55, n.3- 4 (1975). 
A state may lend classroom A state may not lend workbooks in 
workbooks. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 which the parochial school children 
U.S. 354-355, n.3- 4, 362-366 write, thus rendering them 
( 1975). nonreusable. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 
U.S. 349, 354-355, n.3 - 4, 362-366 
(1975). 
A state may pay for bus A state may not pay for bus 
transportation to religious schools. transportation from the parochial 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 schools to the public zoo or natural 
U.S. I (1947). history museum for a field trip. 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 
252-255 ( 1977). 
A state may pay for diagnostic A state may pay for therapeutic 
services conducted in the parochial services but they must be given in a 
school. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. different building. Meek v. 
349,367,371 (1975). Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367, 371 
( 1975). 
227. Keith A. Fournier, In the Wake of Weisman: The Lemon Test is Still a Lemon, But the 
Psycho-Coercion Test is More Bitter Still. 2 REGENT U. L.REV. I. 23 ( 1992). 
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Constitutional Unconstitutional 
A state may conduct speech and A state may not conduct speech and 
hearing diagnostic testing inside the hearing "services" inside the 
sectarian school. Wolman v. Walter, sectarian school. Meek v. Pittenger, 
433 U.S. 229, 241 (1977). 421 U.S. 349, 367, 371 (1975). 
A state may provide counseling to A state may not provide counseling 
exceptional parochial school students to exceptional school students unless 
if outside of the parochial school outside of the parochial school such 
such as a trailer parked down the as a trailer parked down the street. 
street. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 
229,241-248 (1977); Meek v. 241-248 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 352, n. 2, 421 U.S. 349, 352, n. 2, 367-373. 
367-373. 
A state may give cash to a parochial A state may not provide funds for 
school to pay for the administration teacher-prepared tests on secular 
of state-written test and state-ordered subjects. Levitt v. Comm. for Public 
reporting services. Comm. for Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
A state (public school) may release A state (public school) may not 
students during the day for religion provide for religious instruction 
classes elsewhere and may enforce inside a public school. Illinois ex rei. 
attendance at those classes. Zorach McCollum v. Board of Education, 
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-
Ill, 127-136(1985). 
One might add many other examples but a couple will suffice. 228 A 
state legislature may begin each day with a prayer by state paid 
chaplains,229 but students in public school may not begin each day in 
prayer. 230 A school may not display the Ten Commandments in the 
classroom231 but the doors leading into the U.S. Supreme Court chambers, 
as well as the wall behind the justice display the Ten Commandments. 232 
228. For several other examples see Paulsen, supra note 193, at 315-316. 
229. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983). 
230. Wallace v. Jaffree, 1055 SCt. 2479 (1985). 
231 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 ( 1980) (holding the Kentucky statute on posting the Ten 
Commandments in public school classrooms unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause): see 
Paul Grimely Kuntz, The Ten Commandments on School Room Walls~ Whv Did the Supreme Court 
Re;ect the 1971\ Kentucky Statute (Stone v (;mham}.' Could Such 11 L11w Succeed~. lJ U FLA. J.L 
& PUB. PoL'Y I (1997) (analyzing the Kentucky Ten Commandments Statute and suggesting ways 
in which it might it might be rewritten to pass constitutional muster). 
232. See comment by BORK, supra note 15, at 5. 
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b. The Founders' intent 
In discussing intent, the proper methodology one should use must be 
established. Most of the scholars who have argued against interpreting the 
Establishment Clause and the rest of the Constitution by examining the 
intent of those who have drafted it have argued that the intent of the 
Framers is impossible to determine. Further, if one could determine the 
intent, it is irrelevant to the modem application of the clause. 233 However, 
those who advocate what has been labeled "interpreti vism" or 
"originalism" argue that the historical record is clear enough to establish, 
though not demonstrate, 234 the intent of those who framed the 
Constitution. 235 
This seems to be the most reasonable methodology since it coincides 
with the way premises are accepted or rejected in almost every other area 
of mediated study. 236 As it has been noted, to argue that since the historian 
is a product of his or her own time and objectivity is impossible, one 
confuses the content of knowledge with the process of obtaining it. One 
also engages in a self - defeating endeavor since the very statement that 
233. See Borris I. Bittker. The Bicentennial of the Juri.1prudence ol Original Intent: The Recent 
Past, 77 CAL. L. REV. 235 (1989); and Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the 
Framers: The Limits of Fiistorical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 349 (1989) (for a response to the 
objections raised by this author see Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 226 (1988)). It should be noted 
that there is a whole panoply of methodologies which have been suggested for constitutional 
adjudication. Among some of the more innovative ones are: RoNALD D. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (I 977) (arguing for an interpretation of the constitution as laying down "moral concepts" 
rather than "particular conceptions" which require the court to frame and "answer questions ut 
political morality," /d. at 147); John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. RFV 
181 (1987) (arguing that the literary theory of deconstructionism, a methodology which presupposes 
an inherent conflict between contradictory principles or ideas in any text, as applied to the 
constitution may offer some new insights into the "meaning" of the text); and Daniel S. Goodman, 
American Cofl.ltitutionalism and the Myth of" the Creative Era, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 753 (I 989) 
(criticizing the originalist or interpretivist position and offers a view of constitutionalism which 
demands social progress as an end to any legitimate methodology). 
234. Much of the criticism of this position, supra at note 233, comes from the contention that 
absolute certainty cannot be obtained from history. However, as demonstrated in the following portton 
of the text, the methodology that embraces historical objectivity does not require certainty; rather. 
it searches for the meaning that is supported by the evidence. See Aman and House, supra note I 92. 
at 16- I 9 for additional arguments on the possibility of historical objectivity in constitutional 
interpretation. 
235. See Kay, supra note 233, at 236-243; Aman & House, supra note 192, at 16- I 9. In our 
article, we offer a philosophical argument for historical objectivity and note that objectivity is not 
"absolute" knowledge but a ·:fair but revisable" presentation that reasonable men and women should 
accept. 
236. A man & House, supra note I 92, at 18. The example given is that of geology where 
fragmentary evidence is analyzed and hypotheses are accepted or rejected based on an underlying 
epistemology that assumes the possibility of historical objectivity. 
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one cannot come to objective historical conclusions is itself a historical 
conclusion that asserts itself as an objective one. 237 
After determining that objective statements about historical events are 
possible, one can then tum to the documents surrounding the drafting and 
adoption of the First Amendment to discover the intent of those who 
framed it. Since numerous documentations can be analyzed, I will attempt 
only a cursory review of those documents typically invoked when one 
desires to determine the intent of the Framers, and a more detailed look at 
documents that are relevant but often ignored. 238 
In Everson, 239 the Court looked to documents drafted by both Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison as controlling in the Court's interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause. 240 In fact, one historian has suggested that 
Justice Black's treatment of the history of the First Amendment would 
lead one to the conclusion that "Madison and Jefferson fought the battle 
for religious freedom in Virginia, wrote a few letters on the subject, and 
then retired from the issue of defining the proper relationship between 
Church and State."241 In Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," 242 
Madison argues against the use of governmental authority to enforce 
inequality and for the "equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of 
his Religion according to the dictates of conscience."243 Additionally, 
Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists was, at best, an opinion 
about a constitutional provision enacted while he was in France. 244 
Furthermore, the views were distilled from the "Virginia Bill of Religious 
Liberty," which was proposed prior to the events of the Constitutional 
Congress. 245 Although the documents preceding the Congress which 
contain Madison's view of Church and State are important, the events 
during and immediately proceeding the Congress may, perhaps, be more 
relevant in light of the collective effort that was put forth to draft the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
This leads one to examine a number of Madison's actions before, 
during, and after the co-drafting of the First Amendment. Among these 
include Madison's membership on the Congressional Committee that 
2~7. ld 
238 In the proceeding section, I will rely primarily upon the work of CORD. supra note 17, 
at lX-82 
239 330 U.S. at 16,18. 
240. 330 U.S at 11-13 
241 CORD, supra note 17, at 121. 
242. TOWARD A BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 586 
(Ronald B. Flowers & Robert T. Miller eds., 1987). 
243. /d. See also Paulsen, supra note 193, at 326. 
244. See CORD, supra note 17, at 36-47, 120-122, 133-143; Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 
2508-20 (Rehnquist J ., dissenting); Paulsen, supra note 193, at 326. 
245. Cmm, supra note 17. at 20-23. 
262 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
recommended the Chaplaincy system,246 Madison's initial draft of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 247 Madison's successful 
proposal for a law punishing Sabbath breakers which was passed the same 
year as the "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,"248 and Madison's 
"Thanksgiving Day" proclamations passed during his presidency.249 All of 
these would lead one to think that the caricature of Madison as a strict 
separationist contains little, if any, validity when the historical record is 
examined. 
Madison's actions,250 taken in conjunction with the actions of the 
Congress which served under the early presidencies, lead to the historical 
premise that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was drafted 
primarily to proscribe the actions of Congress in regards to the 
establishment of a national religion and the preferential treatment of one 
sect over others. 251 This particular premise is also in agreement with the 
historical understanding of Church and State held by those who helped 
settle America and those who later drafted the Constitution.252 
c. The historical precedence prior to Everson 
Prior to the Everson case in 1947, the Supreme Court had examined 
relatively few cases that dealt with the Establishment Clause. In this 
subsection, I will go through those cases and examine them for a possible 
understanding of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause prior to Everson and its progeny. 
In Bradfield v. Roberts, 253 a suit was brought to enjoin the 
performance of an agreement between a private hospital run by a monastic 
order, Sisters of Charity, and the Commissioners of the District of 
246. CORD. supra note 17, at 23. 
247. "The Civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor 
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of Conscience he in any 
manner, or any pretext, infringed." !d. As Cord points out, it is clear from this proposed amendment 
that Madison viewed the establishment of a state-church as an evil to be protected against through 
the First Amendment. 
248. ld at 217-19. 
249. !d. at 219. 
250. /d. 
251. For a detailed analysis, see CoRD, supra note 17, at 49-82. Cord cites numerous 
documents, including early treaties with American Indians, to support the historicity of the premise 
that the Establishment Clause does not embrace a strict separationist view hut an accommodationist 
one. 
252. For some excellent examples of this, see MARNELL, supra note 189; WINTHROP STILL 
HUDSON & JOHN CORRIGAN, RELIGION IN AMERICA (1965); and SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY 
EXPERIMENT ( 1963). 
253. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The following analysis is taken from Corm, supra note 17. at 103-
04. 
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Columbia and the Surgeon General.254 The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen and 
taxpayer, brought the suit on the grounds that it violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 255 The Supreme Court held that, despite 
the alleged "sectarian character of the hospital,"256 the agreement did not 
violate the Establishment Clause since the case was one of "a secular 
corporation being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the 
Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are managing the 
corporation according to the law under which it exists."257 
The next case involved the use of a Congressional Trust to pay a 
Roman Catholic Mission to educate members of the Sioux tribe. 258 In this 
case, members of the Sioux Tribe brought suit for themselves and all other 
members to enjoin the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from using Indian 
funds to execute the contract with the Catholic Missions. The contract was 
allegedly forbidden by the Indian appropriation acts of 1895, 1896, 1897, 
1898, and 1899.259 The Court analyzed the case not under the 
Establishment Clause but strictly within the confines of the claim that 
payments under the contract were in conflict with the prohibitions of the 
appropriation acts. The Court found that the funds were not traceable to 
monies made available under the acts and, hence, were not subject to the 
prohibitions. 260 
In both Pierce v. Society of Sisters261 and Cochran v. Louisiana State 
Board of Education, 262 the Court had the opportunity to review what, 
potentially, were cases involving First Amendment issues. However, since 
the Establishment Clause had not been incorporated yet, the Court 
analyzed each case under an equal protection, Fourteenth Amendment, 
analysis. In Pierce, the Court discussed the "liberties" which the 
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed; and it found that among these liberties 
was the right of parents to teach their children as they chose. 263 This 
substantive "right" was "found" within the concept of "liberty" in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Cochran, Louisiana's state legislature had 
enacted a law providing for the purchase of secular textbooks for use by 
school children, including those enrolled in parochial schools. 264 The law 
was challenged on the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states 
254. /d. at 295. 
255 /d. 
256. /d. 
257. /d. at 298-99. 
25X. Rueben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S 50 (1908). The following analysis of this cas.; 
is also taken from CoRD, supra note 17, at 104-06. 
259. /d. at 80. 
260. /d. at 77-78. 
261 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
262. 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
263. 268 U S at 534, 535. 
264. 281 U.S. at 373. 
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from depriving persons of their property without due process of law. 265 The 
Court rejected this argument, stating that the benefits of the program were 
not to the parochial schools but to the children of the state of Louisiana, 266 
and introduced the "child benefit theory", a consideration used when 
examining state aid to parochial schools. 267 
d. The meaning of the Establishment Clause prior to Everson 
One can adduce from a historical analysis that an understanding of the 
Establishment Clause, prior to 1947, was one that viewed the clause as 
restricting an establishment of national religion26~ and any preferential 
treatment to a particular religious sect. 269 The writings of both Madison 
and Jefferson, as well as the acts of the initial presidents and Congress270 
and pre-1947 Court decisions, amply demonstrate this premise. Having 
established this, I shall now tum to Everson and the subsequent cases to 
evaluate them in light of this historical perspective of the Establishment 
Clause. 
2. Everson and its progeny 
a. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township271 
The line of demarcation for church-state law was established in 
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township. With this case the 
states were limited in their ability to define church-state relations and a 
"wall of separation" was placed between the previously friendly 
relationship of these two spheres of American life. Knicely says, 
The 194 7 Everson case effected a profound shift of power 
premised upon what Professor Howe has described as "the 
blunt and undocumented assumption that when the nation 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment it was the people's 
purpose to outlaw all state laws respecting an establishment of 
religion, even those which do not appreciably affect property, 
liberty or equality." Whereas before Everson the states had 
been free to define church-state relationships, Everson 
withdrew from "the states the ability to define church-state 
265. !d. at 374. 
266. !d. at 375. 
267. !d. See also Flowers & Miller, supra note 242, at 453. 
268. See CORD. supra note 17, at 229. 
269. See Bradfield v. Roberts, supra note 188 at 297-298. 
270. See CORD, supra note 17, at 21-83. 
271 330 US I (1947) 
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relationships within their own jurisdictions." More 
importantly, Everson, in effect, subjected the states to a 
uniform national regime of law expounded by the Supreme 
Court. Prior to Everson, there were few, if any, Establishment 
Clause decisions in any of the federal courts. After Everson, 
they have been legion. Lower court judges, lawyers, 
commentators, and government officials must now read the tea 
leaves ofthe United States Report quite literally to discern the 
height, length, and depth of what Justice Jackson once 
predicted would be, and has now become, the "serpentine wall" 
dividing church and state. The power of elected government to 
act benevolently toward religion and the moral values 
associated with it, once geared more loosely to standards 
prevalent in the communities of the states, is now bound by a 
straitjacket of judicial doctrine that has become increasingly 
indecipherable because of shifting divisions on the Court 272 
265 
In Everson, the Supreme Court was faced with a case in 
which the Ewing Township Board of Education, pursuant to 
authority granted to it by a New Jersey statute, authorized 
reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for public 
bus transportation of their children to and from school. 273 Part of 
this money went to parents for the payment of transportation to 
and from parochial schools. 274 The appellant was a taxpayer in 
the school district who brought the suit as a violation of 
provisions in the state and federal constitutions,275 claiming that 
the action of the school board violated both the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 276 
The first contention raised by the appellant was readily 
dismissed by the Court on the grounds that the "fact that a state 
law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal 
desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an 
inadequate reason for us to say that a law has erroneously 
appraised the public need."277 This is the same reasoning found 
272. Knicely. supra note 25. at 275 (footnotes omitted). 
273. 330 U.S. at 3. 
274. /d. 
275. /d. at 4. 
276. /d. at 5. 
277. !d. at 4. 
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in Cochran278 that held a tax may be constitutionally valid even 
if the people against whom it is levied are not directly benefited 
by the tax. 279 
The second contention the Court examined was the 
Establishment Clause issue. After a brief analysis of the various 
persecutions of sects which have allegedly flowed from 
government favored churches,280 the Court looked at the history 
of establishment of church-states and state-churches281 in the 
colonies, with particular emphasis on Virginia,282 which Justice 
Black saw as the paradigm for proper analysis. 283 Justice Black 
concluded his historical analysis with this often quoted passage: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against the establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect "a wall of separation between church and State."284 
By making this statement, Justice Black effectively incorporated not 
only the Establishment Clause but also an interpretation of that clause built 
on a concept of strict separation between church and state.m By using the 
278. 281 U.S. 370 (1930), see infra text accompanying note 297. 
279. /d. at 375. 
280. 330 U.S. at 8. 
281. For an excellent discussion arguing that two "types" of institutions existed in the colonial 
era and into the early 19th century (e.g. the "state-church" [Virginia, Georgia] and the "church-state" 
[Massachusetts]). see MARNELL, supra note 189, at 63-72 and 49-61, respectively. Marnell argues 
that the reformation era led to the "Calvinistic" styled church-state of New England, specifically 
Massachusetts, and the English style of the established church influenced the state-church model 
followed in the South. 
282. 330 U.S. at II. 
283. /d. at 12-14. 
284. !d. at 15-16. 
285. See SMITH, supra note 189, at 299. Concerning this opinion, Smith wrote: 
With the dicta of Everson we enter the golden age of the doctrine of separation of church 
and state. Roger Williams' famous metaphor has never been more loudly saluted nor 
more unjustly burdened with so much that is strange to its earliest pronouncement than 
in the train of the Everson case. 
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verb "means" to preface his discussion of the Establishment Clause, 
Justice Black makes an assertion about the historical meaning of the test as 
applied today, opening his analysis to critical evaluation. 
One of the most glaring problems most have noticed about Justice 
Black's decision is the selective use of the historical data. 286 For example, 
both Justice Black's opinion and Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion287 
completely ignore pertinent facts surrounding the adoption of the First 
Amendment. 288 Justice Black's suggestion that the Establishment Clause 
"means" that neither state nor Federal government may aid "all" 
religions289 seems to contradict completely the historical record, 
particularly when both James Madison and early Congresses appropriated 
aid for various religious groups.290 
Additionally, Justice Black's use of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury 
Baptists and his adoption of Jefferson's metaphor91 provide further insight 
into the failure to examine fully the record. 292 As one author notes,293 only 
one year after Jefferson wrote his letter to the Danbury Baptists he 
approved a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, pledging federal money to 
build them a Roman Catholic Church and to support their priest. 294 
Despite the glaring selectivism applied to the historical record that 
produced a strict separationist perspective, a further question is raised by 
the last lines of the majority opinion. Justice Black writes, "The First 
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must 
be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. 
New Jersey has not breached it here."295 If Justice Black's earlier statement 
286. See Smith, supra note 189, at 298; CORD, supra note 17, at 103; and MARNELL, supra 
note 189. Even 'trict separationist Leonard Levy sees the grave problems with Black's analysis: 
Black did not merely misread history, nor wishfully attribute to it a factual content that 
it did not possess; he mangled and manipulated it by artfully selecting facts from one side 
only, by generalizing from grossly inadequate 'proof,' by ignoring confusion and even 
contradictions in the minds of some of his key historical protagonists, and by assuming 
that silence on the part of their opponents signified acquiescence. In this way he invoked 
the fatherhood of 'the framers' in support of his position. 
LEVY, supra note 26 at 68-69. 
287 330 US at 28 (J Rutledge, et aL, dissenTing). 
288 See supra notes 23-36. 
289. 330 U.S. at 15. 
290. See CoRD, supra note 17, at 112, for his discussion of the early appropriation acts, signed 
into law by Madison, which authorized the expenditure of Federal funds for the aid of various 
religious groups working among the Indian tribes. This is particularly relevant since these early 
actions involved Congressional action that is specifically addressed by the Establishment Clause. 
291. 330 U.S. at 16, 18. See also Dreisbach, supra note 17. 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 286-94. 
293 See CoRD, supra note 17, at 115. 
294. !d. Cord's point is well taken. If Jefferson meant by the "wall of separation" a "high and 
impregnable" wall (330 U.S. at 18), he would not have signed the treaty since the treaty provides 
aid to a religious institution. 
295. 330 U.S. at 18. 
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was applicable to the existing facts, one wonders how he could conclude 
that this wall was not breached. In fact the dissenting Justices, led by 
Justice Rutledge, criticized the majority's opinion for not following the 
logical conclusion of its analysis. 296 However, if one examines the analysis 
given by the majority, their reliance upon the aid which is given to all 
citizens and which may coincide with the desires of some is similar to the 
argument given by the Cochran Case in upholding the Louisiana statute. 297 
In Cochran, the Court upheld a statute which gave secular textbooks to all 
children in the state and which happened to benefit those children going to 
the parochial schools. 298 
While it rejects the majority's opinion, the dissent in Everson adopts 
the same historical arguments to conclude that the Establishment Clause 
requires strict separation of church and state. 299 Thus the dissent engages in 
the same selective use of the historical documents, relying primarily on 
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" and Jefferson's Letter. 300 
b. McCollum301 to Lemon302 
Although the majority upheld as constitutional the program of the 
school district in Everson, it was only a matter of time before the strict 
separationist dicta of Everson was used to defeat state action under the 
Establishment Clause. In fact the very next year, 1948, the Court in 
McCollum v. Board of Education303 ruled that a release time program for 
religious instruction violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. The Court relied on the conclusion reached in Everson that 
the "wall of separation" between church and state "must be kept high and 
impregnable"304 while at the same time rejecting the state's argument that 
the First Amendment, historically, was intended to forbid "only 
government preference of one religion over another. "305 
In subsequent cases, the Court gradually developed some tests for the 
application of the Establishment Clause to suspect state action. In Engel v. 
296. !d. at 49. See also Justice Jackson's remark that the majority's opinion reminds him of 
"Julia, who according to Byron's reports. 'whispering "I ne'er consent,"consented.'" (330 U.S at 
19) 
297. !d. at 7; cf 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
298. 281 U.S. at 374. 
299. See 330 U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., with Frankfurter, J., joining); !d. at 31-42 (Rutledge. 
J .. et aJ.). 
300. !d. 
301. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
302. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
303. 333 U.S. at 203. 
304. !d. at 212. 
305. !d. at 211. 
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Vitale, 300 the Court held that a non-denominational prayer, required by the 
public board of education and drafted by a state agency which was recited 
at the beginning of each school day, violated the Establishment Clause. 
The Court utilized the same historical analysis as Everson307 and 
concluded that strict separation of church and state must be sustained.308 
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,309 stated that "the great 
condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance 
as also from other interferences, by the state."310 He found support for this 
statement, which points towards the test by his majority opinion in 
Lemon, ' 11 in Justice Rutledge's dissent in EverJBn. In another case 
decided almost one year later, School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 313 the Court ruled that a statute requiring the reading of ten 
verses from the Bible without comment at the beginning of each school 
day in public school classrooms violates the Establishment Clause, even if 
individual students may be excused. 314 The Court again squarely rejected 
the state's contention that the First Amendment forbids only governmental 
preference of one religion over another.m Furthermore, the Court 
expanded on the neither aiding nor inhibiting of religion test set forth by 
Justice Douglas in Engel. 316 The Court found: 
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose 
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment 
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the 
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of 
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion. 317 
The Court felt that this test was consistent with the interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause that they adopted in the ruling and, for that 
matter, which was adopted in Everson, McCollum, and Engel. 
306. 370 U.S. at 421 
307. /d. at 428. 
308. /d. at 436. 
309. /d. at 437 
:no !d. at 444. 
311 403 US. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
312. 330 U.S. at 29. 
313. 374 us. 203 ( 1963). 
314. !d. at 223. 
315. /d. at 216. 
316. Supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
317 374 US. at 222 (emphasis added) 
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c. The Lemon318 test, a "tripart" analsyis: 
Prior to this decision, the Court applied a rough test of several 
factors including purpose and effect,319 but not entanglement. In 
Lemon, the Court held that a proper Establishment Clause analysis of 
any state or Federal action should include a tripart test: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster 
"an excessive government entanglement with religion."320 
Under this tri-part test, the Establishment Clause allegedly takes 
a "neutral" stand towards religion, promoting government activity in 
extending general benefits to nonreligious and religious interests 
alike.321 
In most of the decisions that soon followed Lemon, the Court 
upheld the application of this tripart test in an Establishment Clause 
analysis. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 322 the Court analyzed a New York statute which permitted 
financial aid to non-public elementary and secondary schools. The 
Court reaffirmed the analysis of Everson, 323 and it adopted the test as 
expounded in Lemon.324 The Court determined that the New York 
statute, "as written," violated the second prong of the Lemon test by 
having a "primary effect that advances religion."325 In Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 326 the Court characterized the Establishment Clause as 
requiring "complete neutrality towards religion," citing the strict 
separation decisions.327 The Court found that the Alabama statute, 
which allowed for a voluntary moment of silence, not to exceed one 
minute, at the beginning of each school day328 violated the first prong 
of the Lemon test by having "no secular purpose."329 
318. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). 
319. Supra note 317. 
320. 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
321. See Bird, Freedom From Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School instruction and 
Religious School Regulation, 1979 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 143-154. 
322. 413 US. 756 (1973). 
323. !d. at 770. 
324. Supra note 320. 
325. 413 U.S. at 798. 
326. 472 U.S 38 (1985) 
327. !d. at 52. 
328. /d. at 38. 
329. /d. at 55 (holding that a statute must have a secular legislative purpose whose pnmary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion). 
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Finally the fourth prong suggested in Lemon, which Justice Brennan 
and Justice Marshall sought to be added, the "political devisiveness" test, 
entails difficulty in that it takes the providence of political interaction 
within a democratic society away from the people and legislatures and 
places it with the life tenured Court. I find it hard to believe that Brennan, 
Marshall, and Burger are attempting to save us from a political controversy 
which they feel we just don't have time enough to consider. Chief Justice 
Burger announced that it "goes against our entire history and tradition to 
permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our 
legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from (other 
issues)."330 
d. Deviations from Lemon 
Not all the Court's decisions have so willingly followed the Everson 
line of cases. In fact, some have significantly deviated from the strict 
separationist approach. Zorach v. Clauson331 is a relatively close case to 
the Everson decision which departed from the strict separation approach. 
In Zorach, w the Court examined a released time program that enabled 
public school students to receive religious instruction off school grounds 
during the school day for an hour each week. 333 The Court ruled that this 
released time program did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it 
merely accommodated religious belief and acknowledged the nation's 
religious heritage. Note the following language: 
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and 
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. 
Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in 
which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on 
the other. That is the common sense matter. Otherwise the 
state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile, 
suspicious, and even unfriendly .... The government must be 
neutral when it comes to competition between sects.334 
330. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971). 
331 343 U.S. 306 (! 952) 
332. !d. 
333. !d. 
334. !d. at 312, 314 (emphasis added). 
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The neutrality that the Court talks about in Zorach335 seems at odds 
with the neutrality mentioned in Lemon336 and those cases following it. In 
Zorach, neutrality is equivalent to accommodation without preferentialism. 
Since the release program was off school grounds and voluntary, the Court 
found no problem with accommodating the religious needs of the 
students. 337 
In a subsequent case, Marsh v. Chambers,m the Court was faced with 
a challenge to a state legislature's use of a paid chaplain who opened each 
session with the chaplain's prayer.339 The Court did not mention the tripart 
test340 and, instead, opted to use an alternative historical test.341 The Court 
also quoted Zorach approvingly, stating that" '[w]e are a religious people 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.' Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306, 313 (1952)."342 This case presents a rather refreshing approach 
that rejects a test when the overwhelming historical evidence points to the 
practice as a permissible means of accommodation. 
One year after Marsh, the Court decided a case343 that addressed the 
display of a creche in a city park. The creche was owned by a non-profit 
organization and included with the nativity scene a Santa Claus house, a 
Christmas tree, and a "Seasons Greetings" banner. 344 The Court found that 
the display did not violate the tripart test in Lemon since the "City has a 
secular purpose for including the creche ... the City has not impermissibly 
advanced religion, and that including the creche does not create excessive 
entanglement between religion and govemment."345 In analyzing the 
second part of the test, the Court found that some advancement or 
accommodation is permissible since the Court "has refused 'to construe 
the Religion Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate 
constitutional objective as illuminated by history.' Walz v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)."346 
A case that is similar to Lynch in its accommodationist use of the 
Lemon test is Bowen v. Kendrick. 347 In this case, the Court looked at the 
335. !d. 306. 
336. 403 U.S 602. 
337. 343 U.S. at 313-314. 
338 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
339. !d. 
340. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
34 I 463 U.S. at 791. The Court states, "This unique history leads us to accept the 
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause 
arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged." !d. 
342. !d. at 792. 
343. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
344. !d. at 671. 
345. !d. at 685. 
346. !d. at 678. 
347. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
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validity of the Adolescent Family Life Act which provided for, in part, aid 
to organizations that provided services necessary for the care of pregnant 
adolescent parents and adolescent parents. 348 The court rejected the 
Establishment claim, finding that the primary effect of the statute did not 
advance religion due to the "long history of cooperation and 
interdependency between governments and charitable or religious 
organizations."349 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, states in a 
concurring opinion that the fact that public funds go to pervasively 
sectarian institutions is not sufficient to invalidate a statute that has been 
found constitutional on its face. 350 
Possibly the most significant Establishment Clause case since Lemon 
is Agostini v. Felton. 351 Agostini has squarely moved from a strict 
separationist position to an accommodationist approach regarding the issue 
of government aid that directly aids the educational religious 
organizations. The significance of this case is evident when the Court 
contrasted two earlier cases in its analysis. 
In Aguilar v. Felton, 352 the United States Supreme Court, in applying 
the Lemon test, held that New York City's program that sent public school 
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education necessitated 
an excessive entanglement of church and state and, therefore, violated the 
Establishment Clause. In a companion case, School District of Grand 
Rapids v. Ball,353 the Supreme Court held that a "Shared Time" program 
was analogous to New York City's Title I program and, therefore, was 
invalid. The Court found in both cases that providing government funding 
for religious organizations violated the third prong of Lemon. Since 
parochial schools were deemed to have an atmosphere dedicated to the 
advancement of religious belief, any instruction in that atmosphere was 
perceived to create "[t]he potential for impermissible fostering of 
religion. "35~ 
According to Ball, the presence of public teachers on parochial school 
grounds had a second related impermissible effect: It created a "graphic 
symbol of the 'concert or union or dependency' of church and state,"355 
especially when perceived by "children in their formative years."356 The 
Court feared that this perception of a symbolic union between church and 
348. 42 U.SC ~§ 300z to 300z-l0 (1982). 
349. 487 U.S. at 604. 
350. /d. at 622. Justice Kennedy states, "the question in an as-applied challenge is not whether 
the entity is ol a religious character. but how it spends its grant." 
351. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997). 
352. 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985). 
353. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) 
354. /d. at 386 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975)) 
355. /d. at 391 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US. 306, 312 (1952)). 
356. /d. at 390. 
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state would "conve[y] a message of government endorsement ... of 
religion" and thereby violate a "core purpose" of the Establishment 
Clause.357 
Third, the Court found that the Shared Time program impermissibly 
financed religious indoctrination by subsidizing "the primary religious 
mission of the institutions affected. "358 The Court separated its prior 
decisions evaluating programs that aided the secular activities of religious 
institutions into two categories: those in which it concluded that the aid 
resulted in an effect that was "indirect, remote, or incidental" (and upheld 
the aid); and those in which it concluded that the aid resulted in "a direct 
and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise" (and invalidated 
the aid). 359 In light of Meek and Wolman, Grand Rapids' program fell into 
the latter category. 
The New York City Title I program challenged in Aguilar closely 
resembled the Shared Time program struck down in Ball, but the Court 
found fault with an aspect of the Title I program not present in Ball: The 
Board had "adopted a system for monitoring the religious content of 
publicly funded Title I classes in the religious schools."360 Even though 
this monitoring system might prevent the Title I program from being used 
to inculcate religion, the Court concluded, as it had in Lemon and Meek, 
that the level of monitoring necessary to be "certain" that the program had 
an exclusively secular effect would "inevitably resul[t] in the excessive 
entanglement of church and state," thereby running afou I of Lemon's third 
prong.>6t 
The Court's conclusion that the Shared Time program in Ball had the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion rested on three assumptions: (i) 
any public employee who works on the premises of a religious school is 
presumed to inculcate religion in her work; (ii) the presence of public 
employees on private school premises creates a symbolic union between 
church and state; and (iii) any and all public aid that directly aids the 
educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances religious 
indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of 
private decisionmaking. 
Since Aguilar and Ball, the Court has had several opportunities to 
revisit the issue of whether placement of government officials or giving of 
aid to sectarian schools was presumptively a government inculcation of 
religious belief. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,362 the 
357. !d. at 389. 
358 !d. at 385. 
359. !d. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
360. !d. at 409. 
361. !d. 
362. 509 U.S I (1993) 
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Court expressly disavowed the notion that "the Establishment Clause [laid] 
down [an] absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian 
school."363 "Such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of 'taint,' 
would indeed exalt form over substance."364 Instead, the Court assumed 
that the interpreter would dutifully discharge her responsibilities as a full 
time public employee and comply with the ethical guidelines of her 
profession by accurately translating what was said. 365 Because the only 
government aid in Zobrest was the interpreter, who was herself not 
inculcating any religious messages, no government indoctrination took 
place and the Court was able to conclude that "the provision of such 
assistance [was] not barred by the Establishment Clause."366 
In Agostini, the Court also acknowledged that it had departed from the 
idea found in Ball that all governmental aid that directly assists the 
educational function of religious schools is invalid. Thus, Agostini 
acknowledges that it is no longer, as a matter of law, presumed that 
governmental aid results in a "symbolic union" of church and state. 
The Court also looked at whether such aid would result in excessive 
entanglement. The Court found that not all entanglements have the effect 
of advancing or inhibiting religion. The Court states, "[i]nteraction 
between church and state is inevitable, ... and we have always tolerated 
some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be 
'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause."367 
The Court concluded by holding: I) "that a federally funded program 
providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on 
a neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause when such 
instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by government 
employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those 
present here;" and 2) "that a carefully constrained program also cannot 
reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion. "368 
e. Alternatives to the Lemon tripart test 
In recent years the Court has used two major alternative tests to that of 
Lemon, the endorsement test and the coercion test. Neither test has yet 
received much support from the entire Court ss serious permanent 
alternatives to the Lemon tests. 
363. !d. at 13. 
364. ld. 
365 !d. at 12 
366. !d. 
367. Agostini. 117 S.Ct at 2015. See, e.g .. Bowan. 487 U.S. at 615-17. 
368. !d. at 2016. 
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1. Endorsement test 
The chief proponent of this test is Justice O'Conner. 369 Justice 
O'Conner argues for the abandonment of the entanglement prong as an 
element for separate analysis. 370 She reasons that the "anomalous 
results"371 in many of the Court's analyses of Establishment Clause claims 
were due to the "establishment prong" of the tri-part test. 372 Thus in 
Wallace v. Jaffree, m Justice O'Conner argues that "direct government 
action endorsing religion or particular religious practice is invalid under 
this approach because it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.' "374 She argues that "endorsement is 
useful" because of the "analytical content" it gives to the Lemon-mandated 
inquiry. 375 Justice O'Conner views this as a type of preference test since "it 
does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking 
religion into account in making law and policy,"376 however, it does 
"preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message 
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."377 
This view has met with considerable acceptance, particularly among 
those who wish to maintain the Lemon test. 378 However, it has also faced 
its share of criticism. One critic is Justice Kennedy who, in his dissenting 
opm10n in Allegheny v. ACLU, 379 cntiCizes Justice O'Conner's 
endorsement test as one that requires an inquiry "into the feelings of the 
369. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (!989) (O'Conner, J., concurrin);); Aguilar v 
Felton, 473 US. 402, 422-30 (1985) (O'Conner, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668, 
691-692 (19841 (O'Conner, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Conner, J, 
concurring in judgment); see also Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Tmlilrds 
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Conner's hw);ht. 
64 N.CL. REV. 1049, 1050-1052 (1986). 
370. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 422-30 (O'Conner, J., dissenting). 
371. See Alexandra Petrich, Bowen v. Kendrick: Retreat From Prophylaxis in Church-Swte 
Relationships, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 513, 521 (1989): 
For example, we permit a State to pay for bus transportation to a parochial school, 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US. I (1947), but preclude states from providing 
buses for parochial school field trips, on the theory that such trips involve excessi vc state 
supervision of the parochial officials who lead them. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 
(1977). 
!d. at n.62. 
372. !d. at 521 n.63 ( 1989) 
373. 472 US. 38. 
374. !d. 
375. !d. 
376. !d. 
377. !d. 
378. See Loewy, sttpra note 369; Note, S/wrpenin); the Pron!is of the Establtshment Clause: 
Applying Stricter Scrutiny to Majority Religions, 23 GA. L.REY. 1085 ( 1989) 
379. 492 U.S 573, 654 < 1989) 
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objective observer" without any meaningful guidance on resolution of that 
inquiry. 380 Justice Kennedy's point lies in his perception of the inherent 
ambiguities in Justice O'Conner's approach. 
2. Coercion tesf81 
One of the first cases to use a coercion analysis in relation to the 
establishment clause was Engel. 382 The Supreme Court found that a public 
school prayer ("Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon 
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
Country") said aloud each day in each classroom with a teacher present, 
violated the Establishment Clause. 383 Although the Court was clear to 
state, "[W]hile proof of coercion might provide a basis for a claim under 
the Free Exercise Clause, it [is] not a necessary element of any claim under 
the Establishment Clause")384 The Court went on to find that "when the 
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a 
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion IS 
plain. "385 
This analysis was incorporated into a component of the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman test in the fragmented Allegheny v. ACLU, opinion. 386 In 
Allegheny, Allegheny County had permitted (since 1981) a Roman 
Catholic group to display a creche in the county courthouse. Eventually, 
the creche was displayed in a separate area of the courthouse (on a 
staircase) near a "gallery forum" (with other cultural displays) but far 
enough away to be distinguished from the forum. The case also involved a 
challenge to the display of a Menorah in front of the City-County building. 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, rejects the interpretation of the 
Lemon prong (primary or principle effect of the government practice 
should neither advance nor inhibit religion) that would include any direct 
or symbolic advancement. He states that "absent coercion, the risk of 
infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is 
minimal. Our cases reflect this reality by requiring a showing that the 
symbolic recognition or accommodation advances religion to such a degree 
380. !d. See also Hirt. "Symboltc Union" of Church and State and The "Endorsement" of 
Sectanclll Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 24 W FOR. 
LR. 823 (!989) 
381. Rodriguez, God is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 
23 SAINT MARY'S LJ. 1155, 1171-1184 (1992). 
382. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 ( 1962). 
383. /d. at 430 (1962) 
384. !d. 
385. /d. at 431 
386. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (!989). 
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that it actually "establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so."387 He goes on to state how coercion may be evident: 
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may 
not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or 
callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a 
degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious 
faith, or tends to do so." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 678. These 
two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be 
difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of 
more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply 
the substantial benefits that would sustain [492 U.S. 573, 660] a 
state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or 
governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to 
proselytizing. 388 
In Lee v. Weisman, 389 public school officials in middle and high 
schools in providence would routinely invite members of the clergy to give 
invocations and benedictions at their school's graduation ceremonies. 
Justice Kennedy wrote, "the principle that government may accommodate 
the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations 
imposed by the Establishment Clause."39° Kennedy found that the school's 
action violated the second prong of the Lemon test by coercing students, 
who "are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards 
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social 
convention."391 Kennedy goes on to explain how this is distinguished from 
Marsh where the Court did not find a violation of the establishment clause. 
Kennedy states, 
But there are also obvious differences. The atmosphere at the 
opening of a session of a state legislature, where adults are 
free to enter and leave with little comment and for any 
number of reasons, cannot compare with the constraining 
potential of the one school event most important for the 
student to attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise 
in a school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise 
we condoned in Marsh. The Marsh majority in fact gave 
387. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678. 
388. !d. at 662. 
389. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
390. !d. at 587. 
391. !d. at 593. 
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specific recognition to this distinction, and placed particular 
reliance on it in upholding the prayers at issue there. 392 
f Summary: separation to accommodation 
279 
From the foregoing, one can see two distinct directions the Court has 
taken in Establishment Clause analysis. The first, represented by the 
general strict separationist sentiments of Everson, 393 tends to utilize a 
tripart test as an instrument that roots out any vestige of separation. The 
second, represented by Zorach394 and cases following it, especially 
Agostini, 395 presents an accommodationist view of history that allows non-
preferential aid to religions. 
3. In search of a new model for Establishment Clause claims 
Strict separation is an unworkable, if not unconstitutional, model. 
Articulated in Everson,396 but arguably not followed,397 it posits a view of 
the church and state which is out of accord with the intention of the 
Framers,398 sets forth a misguided, if not contrived, presentation of the 
historical information on which it relies,399 and is contrary to the 
relationship between organized religion and the state for most of 
America's history.400 Everson could not apply the strict separation model it 
engendered because of the generally understood meaning of the First 
Amendment that preceded Everson. It floundered in trying to separate 
religion itself from generally applicable and non-preferential government 
assistance to school children without distinction. This may be a significant 
contributing factor that brought the inconsistency in Everson. Moreover, 
the comments of Justice Black are addressed to the institutional church or 
392 463 U S. 792. 
393. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). 
394. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 ( 1952). 
395. 521 U S. 203. 
396. 330 U.S. I (1947) 
397 330 U.S. at 18 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissentin~;): 
[The] Court's opinion marshals every argument in favor of state aid and puts the 
case in its most favorable light, but much of its reasoning confirms my 
conclusions that there are no good grounds upon which to support the present 
legislation. In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and 
uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its 
conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters. 
398. See supra text accompanying footnotes 58-179. 
399. See comment by LEVY, supra note 286. 
400. See supra text accompanying footnotes 58-179. 
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its sub-groups such as schools, not to individual religious practices of 
citizens. Subsequent Court decisions attacked individual religious 
practices apart from the matter of the institution of the church and the 
institution of the state. 
Recent Court decisions have begun to unravel these strict separationist 
perspectives enacted through the artificial Lemon tests, instead favoring 
more of an accommodationist view. The Lemon tests are still referred to in 
an erratic way, but Lemon and strict separation appear to be gone for the 
immediate future. As one author has noted, the decision in Bowen v. 
Kendrick401 has sufficiently eroded the Lemon test so that there is a need 
for a new "intellectually defensible" standard. 402 Subsequent cases have 
even done more so. It is this need that has created in the past number of 
years suggestions for re-tooling the tripart test or re-inventing another test 
altogether and has caused Courts and legal scholars seek to find a new vie 
of the Establishment Clause which does not yield such divergent and 
contradictory decisions.403 
The purpose of this section is not to catalogue every attempt to grapple 
with a new model for Establishment Clause jurisdiction; rather, its purpose 
is to present certain representative approaches to understanding the 
Establishment Clause or models that are oriented around fairly clear 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause. Each of these models is an 
attempt to allow the Establishment Clause to be more "friendly" toward 
religion. Once a commitment has been made to a particular understanding 
of what the clause "means," one then can analyze the appropriate 
significance of this meaning.404 
a. State constitutions 
Some authors, disturbed with the "trend" in Establishment Clause 
adjudication on the federal level, have urged litigants to go to their state 
constitutions since they provide stricter, more explicit prohibitions on the 
relationship between the state and religion.405 Although this does not solve 
40 I 487 U S. 589. 
402. See Petrich. supra note 371 
403. An emerging alternative theory, not discussed in this article, to that of strict separatiomsrn 
and accomodationism, is the neutrality theory. See ESBECK, supra, note 44; see also Carl H. Esbcck. 
The Establishment Clause: an Individual Rights Guarantee Or a Structural Clause Limiting 
Governmental Power~. 84 IOWA LREV. I (1998). 
404. Arnan and House, supra note 192. 
405. See Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship of 
Religious Displays Under the Federal and CalifiJmia Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 499 (1986); 
and Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the 
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST LQ 451 (1988) 
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the Federal Establishment Clause issue, it does, perhaps, provide a 
"stricter" forum for the decision of Establishment Clause issues in general. 
b. Deconstruction and moral theory 
I have placed these rather divergent theories together since, though 
they posit different models, they both require a non-interpretivist approach 
to the Establishment Clause. 
The theory of deconstruction of a text is not new; it has been applied 
in the area of literary theory for quite some time.406 Deconstructionism 
essentially views text as a "scene of repressed conflict"407 that the reader 
inevitably joins as the text is read. Such a theory is based on a type of 
Hegelian understanding whereby the text presents both thesis and 
antithesis; and the reader may or may not provide a synthesis. It is this 
synthesis, obtained internally by the reader, which becomes the meaning of 
the text. Thus, it is not difficult to conceive how nine Supreme Court 
Justices may develop nine syntheses of the text. It is also not difficult to 
see the inherent problems with such an approach. The essential task 
accomplished by the reading involves how "it may enlarge our thoughts 
about what a constitution is and how one can live in it."408 Although 
"readings that develop this perspective [a deconstructionist one] should not 
lead to the demolition and dismissal of the Constitution,"409 this is the very 
thing that happens. Once the text is couched in internally conflicting terms, 
the text "unwinds" under any "objective" attempt to analyze it. 
Another non-interpretivist model advocated is the "political-moral 
reasoning model" of Establishment Clause adjudication. 410 This approach 
may either find the non-interpretivist position unconvincing411 or as 
defensible, yet not preferable, to the non-interpretivist.412 The theory is 
founded on the idea of "moral evolution" or "belief in moral progress."413 
In applying this to the Establishment Clause, one author has commented, 
"None of these relatively nonactivist theories, however, adequately 
explains the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine. This 
doctrine requires instead a nonoriginalist theory of political-moral 
reasoning, a theory that permits the Court simply to identify and apply 
406. See JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (B. Johnson trans, 1981); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF 
GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans 1976); and BARBARA JOHNSON, D1E CRITICAL DIFFERENCE (1980) 
407. Leubsdorf, supra note 233, at 182. 
408. !d. at 181. 
409. !d. 
410. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory o{the c'stablishment Clause, 82 NW. 
U.L REV. 1113 (1988). 
411. See DWORKIN, supra note 233. 
412. See MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). 
413. !d. at 97. 
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principles and policies that are sound."414 He goes on to state that "judicial 
activism of the sort defended here may be indefensible in other areas of 
constitutional law. In this particular setting, however, the court's activism 
is not merely justified, it is essential to the political and moral health of our 
society."415 
Critics of this theory have laid the ax, so to speak, at its roots by 
challenging the concept of "moral evolution." The term is not self-
defining. Rather, it raises all sorts of questions about what type of "moral" 
goals should we be working towards. As one commentator noted, "the 
question of 'moral evolution' like that of 'social progress' is ultimately a 
political question. To disjoin moral evolution and political philosophy ... 
is necessmily unsatisfactory. Put differently, any adequate defense of 
'human rights' must be, ultimately, a political defense, a defense of a 
particular kind of society."416 Thus, the political-moral theory is one, 
ultimately, of good intentions but without objective direction. 
c. Institutional separation 
This model proposes the "eighteenth century" view of the 
Establishment Clause as one that recognizes an institutional separation of 
church and state be adopted over the "twentieth century" view that 
interprets the "disestablishment" clause as a commitment to secular 
government and policies.417 The "original" commitment to institutional 
separation is seen as having two purposes:418first, to protect the state from 
"control or corruption" by the church,419 and second, to protect the church 
from "control or corruption" by the state.420 Thus, the "essential task" of 
the Establishment Clause would be both to prevent government from 
interfering "with the internal affairs of religious institutions and, 
conversely, to prohibit religious institutions from directly exercising 
governmental authority."421 Under this approach, essential questions would 
involve the institutional interactions between government and religion. 
Some critics of this model have pointed out that it would significantly 
cut back the role of the judiciary in Establishment Clause questions.422 If 
the alternative to institutional separation, integration of church and state, is 
414. Conkle, supra note 410, at 1193. 
415. /d. at 1194. 
416. CHARLES HERMAN PRITCHEIT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 70 (5th ed. 1981 ). 
417. Smith, supra note 31, at 955. 
418. /d. at 1016. 
419. /d. 
420. /d. 
421. /d. 
422. See Gerard v_ Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Reli!iious 
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. LREV. 674, at 679 (1987). 
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no longer a possibility, the adoption of a separation construction would 
seemingly render the Establishment Clause superfluous.423 However, the 
model does coincide with the historical or interpretivist view.424 
Additionally, the test would solve the "conflict" between the current 
establishment and free exercise clause analysis.425 Additionally, it is argued 
that this model would permit an accommodationist approach as the 
purpose for free exercise exemptions. The concept of establishment as any 
government involvement with religion would be done away with and in its 
stead, a concept of institutional separation would permit certain types of 
interaction. 426 
d. Class action and Equal Protection models 
In a student note,427 the author responds to recent arguments that have 
been made about the complementary nature of the two "clauses" in the 
First Amendment.428 He notes that although this view coincides with the 
text and history of the First Amendment, it raises the question of whether it 
is improper to "collapse them into each other."429 It is from this concern 
that he suggests a new approach. The Establishment Clause, functionally, 
is a "public Jaw" analogue of the Free Exercise Clause.430 Traditionally, 
free exercise claims have been framed as requiring a compelling state 
interest to justify the "coercion" of an individual's religious exercise.431 
The protection from being required to act contrary to one's religious 
convictions is the "heart of the religious liberty guaranteed by the First 
Amendment."432 This element of coercion has also been identified in cases 
involving one entity that receives a "public benefit" while another, 
similarly situated, does not.433 This disparity in treatment can also be 
viewed as government "endorsement."434 
Although the concept of group litigation or class action was not 
present at the framing of the constitution, it might provide a realistic and 
uniform approach to protect the types of interests, injury to individual 
423. Sm1th. supra note 31, at 1029. 
424. /d. at 959-975. 
425. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Smith, supra note 31, at 990. 
426. /d. 
427. Note, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class Actions, 98 
YALE LR. 1739 (1989). 
428. /d. 
429. /d. 
430. 
431. 
432. 
433. 
434. 
/d. 
/d. 
ld 
/d. 
/d. 
at 1745. 
at 1746. 
at 1748. 
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religious liberties, which the Establishment Clause allegedly protects 
against.435 This view would allegedly clear up the standing and remedial 
problems currently associated with Establishment and Free Exercise 
Claims.436 
Potential problems with this approach might arise in the court's 
application of class action concepts to First Amendment claims. The First 
Amendment protects what has been traditionally viewed as an individual 
right. Although the Establishment Clause may arguably not do so, the Free 
Exercise Clause does. Converting Establishment Clause analysis into a 
class action claim may minimize the free exercise claim underlying it. 
Another approach that has been argued is an equal protection model 
utilized for both establishment and free exercise claims.437 This approach 
would seek to use a strict scrutiny/compelling state interest approach in 
cases that involve a free exercise claim or burden.438 The Establishment 
Clause is viewed as protecting religious libertl39 and the free exercise 
clause as defining the freedom of religious liberty-religious exercise.440 
Thus, the free exercise clause "defines the important individual liberty 
while the Establishment Clause addresses the limits of allowable state 
classifications affecting this liberty."441 The equal protection analysis 
would accomplish the same effect by viewing any religious hias 
classification as "suspect," requiring a strict scrutiny analysis. 442 
Although this model has a high view of the history and text of the First 
Amendment, it is based on a test that is potentially ambiguous. The strict 
scrutiny/compelling state interest analysis lacks the same "objective" frame 
of reference as the above-described "endorsement" test. 443 
e. Nonpreferentialism 
This is the view widely accepted prior to the Everson decision and 
enjoys considerable historical evidence of its practice in the founding 
period and thereafter.444 Yet this is a specific view singled out by the 
Everson court when it said that the Establishment Clause at least means 
this: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can . . . aid all 
435. !d. 
436. /d. at 1754. 1756. 
437. Paulsen, supra note 193. 
438. /d. at 313. 
439. /d. 
440. /d. 
441 /d. 
442. !d. at 324. 
443. See text accompanying notes 369-80. 
444. See generally, DREISBACH, supra note 184. 
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religions."445 This addition serves as a major reason why the court has had 
confusing holdings for more than fifty years. 
In contrast to the separationist model, nonpreferentialism reflects the 
sense of the freedom of religion envisioned by the Founders of the 
Constitution. They wanted to minimize the tension among competing 
religious groups (though not obliterating the Christian worldview that 
underpinned the government and law) and to broadened the exercise of 
personal and corporate religious freedom. The evidence is plain446 that this 
was their design and they were largely consistent with this intent: 
Probably, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, 
and of the amendment to it, now under consideration, the 
general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that 
Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the State, so 
far as such encouragement was not incompatible with the 
private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious 
worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a 
matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would 
have created universal disapprobation, if not universal 
indignation. 447 
The pluralistic attitude of the Framers, however, does not mean that 
they would view Christianity alongside of other religions as being equal. 
Joseph Story sets forth his view of the sentiment of these Framers that may 
have preferred Christianity to other religions: 
The real object of the First Amendment was not to 
countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or 
Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to 
exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any 
national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a 
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. 
It thus cuts off the means of religious persecution (the vice and 
pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of 
conscience in matters of religion which had been trampled 
upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present 
age.448 
445. Everson. 330 U.S. at 15. 
446. See CORD, supra note 17. 
447. JOSEPH STORY. FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION ( 1862) 
448. JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES * 1874. 
at 593 (2nd ed., 1851) cited in CORD, supra note 17, at 13. See also FEDERER, supra note 2 at 573-
575; Jaflree v. Board ol School Commissioners of Mobile County, 544 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala 
1983); THE ASSAULT ON RELIGION: COMMENTARIES ON THE DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 84 
(Russell Kirk ed. 1986); GARY DEMAR, AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN HISTORY: THE UNTOLD STORY 113 
(1993) 
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In the eighteenth century there were no true rivals to Christianity in the 
public or private spheres and so the concern for parity was of little 
concern. Today various religious groups grace the religious completion of 
America but the principle of equity among religions envisioned by the 
Framers holds similar viability. When the government allows freedom for 
all religions and equally permits participation in the opportunities offered 
to all citizens, it serves rightly the intent of the First Amendment. 
f Suggestions for developing an operative model 
The proposal for a new model to Establishment Clause adjudication is 
not without potential problems, as seen above. Furthermore, the Court's 
retreat from granting religious exercise claims that conflict with any 
government interest, compelling or not, seems to be quickening at an 
alarming rate.449 This has been attributed to the "conservative" majoritJ50 
that now exists on the Supreme Court. Yet, whatever the reason, it seems 
apparent that the Lemon test will undergo further mutation. Furthermore, 
the narrow distinctions made between supplying parochial school with 
books but not maps,451 has been ridiculed for the seemingly absurd lines 
that the Supreme Court has drawn in the name of Lemon.452 
In formulating a new model, I believe those based on a non-originalist 
view453 and those which rely on a non-objective model are doomed to 
continue a clash between the Religion Clauses. A model that gives due 
consideration to the historical evolution of American law within a Judea-
Christian framework and yet allows for the pluralistic development of 
religions requires a non-preferential and institutional separation 
449. See, L.A. nMES April 18, 1990. sec. I col. 3. The article discusses Employment Division 
v. Smith, written by Justice Scalia, which criticizes past accommodation of individual religious 
exercise over government interest. The case involved a Native American Indian's use of peyote in 
religious exercises Justice Scalia argued that a compelling interest no longer needed to be asserted 
although he did suggest that if an individual's religious freedom is to be protected. Congress could 
provide such protection through legislation. 
450. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia. Justice O'Conner and Justice 
Kennedy. 
451. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, at 252-255 (1977) (invalidating a loan to 
parochial schools of materials such as maps and globes because these materials would be used in 
an integrated and religious education) with Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) 
(sustaining a loan of books to parochial schools because there was no indication that the books would 
be used to teach religion). See also Smith, supra note 31, at I 022. 
452. See Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Reli~:ious Doctrine. 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 352 (1986) 
453. See text accompanying notes 233-36. 
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approach.454 Thus, I would prefer to endorse the institutional separation 
view. This view seems to be the most objective in its application.455 In 
cases that deal with state aid programs, the question asked by the Court 
would shift from whether tile program, in some way, "advances religion" 
to whether the program directly and impermissibly involves the state in the 
internal affairs of a religious institution.456 The separation construction 
would not require the courts to determine whether the form of aid is purely 
or inherently secular. State aid that might have the "effect" of assisting 
religion would not, of itself, require invalidation of the law.457 
Additionally, it would reduce the number of conflicts between the 
Establishment Clause and other Constitutional provisions such as free 
exercise and free speech clauses.458 For example, in exempting religious 
believers from military service or compulsory secondary education, 
government would not have to interfere with the doctrine or ecclesiastical 
structure of religious institutions. However, under the secularism 
requirement, this type of accommodation would be impermissible since it 
both serves a religious purpose and it has the effect of advancing religion 
by facilitating the practice of religious convictions.459 In situations like this 
the Court would only need to look to religious liberty or free exercise 
concerns, not establishment. 
The institutional separation model may help in keeping the state out of 
the institution of the church but what about activities such as prayer at 
public gatherings that are not strictly "church" activities. In situations like 
this, the direct coercion standard advocated in the dissent by Justice Scalia 
in Lee v. Weisman may prove helpful. In this matter, only what directly 
interferes with religious liberty becomes an establishment of religion. No 
one can be pressured or forced by the government to practice a religious 
exercise or adopt religious beliefs. Such coercion would not be interpreted 
as being respectful and quiet as someone is allowed to practice their own 
belief. Ralph Johnson correctly points out that in Lee v. Weisman, the 
Weismans were not coerced by force oflaw or threat of penalty 
to join in the graduation prayers. Indeed, they never 
complained of any coercion to participate. Rather, Mr. 
454. See Smith, supra note 31. 
455. ld at 1021. 
456. !d. 
457. !d. Although it would not prevent the government from advancing religion in certain ways 
(see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)), it would 
prevent government from establishing an official state church or conferring governmental powers 
upon churches (see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), a statute pennitting churches 
to veto applications for liquor licenses when the establishment applying for said license is within 
500-foot radius of the church was held unconstitutional). 
458. See Smith, supra note 31, at I 026. 
459. !d. 
288 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
Weisman was "opposed to and offended by the inclusion of the 
prayer." However, under the direct coercion test, this can not 
be the basis of an Establishment Clause violation.460 
Although the Establishment Clause began its "career" in the concept 
of separation of church and state,461 the phrase came to mean, in the 
twentieth century, political and governmental secularism.462 In an attempt 
to recapture the true meaning of the Establishment Clause, one can find a 
test and approach to Religion Clause jurisprudence, I believe, that is both 
workable and consistent with the proper interpretation of the First 
Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Providing for institutional separation of church and state but not 
intruding into voluntary religious expression of individuals is the ideal 
manner for religion and government to function in our pluralistic society. 
The continuing clash between religion and the state is due to the attempt to 
separate us from our past, a past that cannot be eradicated from our law 
and government without doing irreparable harm to our form of 
government. The rise of non-Christian religions provides a challenge, but 
not one insurmountable. Allowing all religious perspectives access to the 
public forums of America is both legally correct and religiously satisfying. 
It is impossible (and perhaps undesirable) to aspire to a completely secular 
state that is devoid of any public religious expression. Religion, for good 
or ill, has been the foundation of Western law and provided the very model 
for legitimate "separation" and it remains one of the primary motivations 
for human action. It serves at the "lynchpin" for fundamental freedoms 
such as liberty and equality. The strict separationist model, as found in the 
majority of the cases from Everson through Lemon, and still occasionally 
haunts the Court's decisions, needs to be forever abandoned and a model 
which keeps the state out of the activities of organized religion, but not 
religion from the public sector, needs to be warmly embraced by the Court. 
When the state provides for the general public, religion may have 
nonpreferential access to the benefits of government without there being 
an establishment, as long as government does not try to dictate to the 
460. Johnson. Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Make Bad Law Too-The Direct Coercion Test 
is the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard, 2 GEO. MADISON [NDENDENT L REV. 123, 192 
(1993) 
461. In using this phrase, I am speaking of the historical concept of separation which would 
be that of the institutions of Church and State. See CORD, supra note 17. 
462. See Smith, supra note 31, at 975-979. 
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religious entity. When groups or individuals have a public forum, they 
should be on the same footing with non-religious groups and individuals 
and toleration should be expressed toward all. The key is that there be no 
force of the government to require one to practice religious ritual or 
devotion nor adopt religious beliefs that are specifically sectarian in nature; 
this is the vision of the Framers based on the Reformation foundation. 
The kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world are not 
incompatible when we move toward such a model that I have suggested. 
Many details need to be worked out, but the state and religion can 
peacefully exist without either losing its proper function in America. 
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APPENDIX 
The following graphs reveal the level at which the Bible and 
Blackstone were heavily relied on during the period of 1760-1805:463 
DISTRIBUTION OF CITATIONS BY DECADE 
1760s 1770s 1780s 1790s 1800-05 Total% 
Bible 24 44 34 29 38 34 
Enlight'ment 32 18 24 21 18 22 
Whig 10 20 19 17 15 18 
Common Law 12 4 9 14 20 ll 
Classical 8 11 10 11 2 9 
Peers 6 2 3 6 5 4 
Others 8 I I 2 2 2 
CITATIONS OF THINKERS IN EARLY AMERICA BY DECADE(%) 
1760s 1770s 1780s 1790s 1800-05 Total% 
Montesquieu 8 7 14 4 I 8.3 
Blackstone 1 3 7 11 15 7.9 
Locke ll 7 I I 1 2.9 
Hwne 1 1 1 6 5 2.7 
Plutarch 1 3 1 2 4 1.3 
Pufendorf 4 0 1 0 5 1.3 
Coke 5 0 1 2 4 1.3 
Hobbes 0 I 1 0 0 1.0 
Others 69 78 73 74 65 73.3 
46.1 Hyncman. Sllf'm note II 8 Sec these charts in EIDSMOE, supra note 136, at 52- 53; and 
Lutz, sUJ'm note I 04, at l X9 - !97. 
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QUANTITY ORDERING OF MOST CITED THINKERS, 1760-1805 (%) 
1. Montesquieu 8.3% 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
15. 
17. 
19. 
25. 
28. 
31. 
Blackstone 
Locke 
Hume 
Plutarch 
Coke 
Cicero 
Hobbes 
Rousseau 
Bacon 
Shakespeare 
Plato 
Machiavelli 
Voltaire 
7.9% 
2.9% 
2.7% 
1.5% 
1.3% 
1.2% 
1.0% 
.9% 
.8% 
.8% 
.5% 
.5% 
.5% 
The most quoted source, including books and authors, during the 
Constitutional Period, 1780s-1790s was the Old Testament book of 
Deuteronomy, the Covenant Book. 
